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ABSTRACT 
In this study the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
valuation, ownership structure and need of external financing for the Karachi 
Stock Market is examined for the period 2003 to 2008. To measure the firm-
level governance a rating system is used to evaluate the stringency of a set of 
governance practices and cover various governance categories: such as board 
composition, ownership and shareholdings and transparency, disclosure and 
auditing. The sample consists of 60 non-financial firms listed on Karachi Stock 
Exchange and comprises more than 80 percent of market capitalization at 
Karachi Stock Market in 2007. The results confirms the theoretical notion that 
firms with better investment opportunities and larger in size adopt better 
corporate governance practice. The proposition that ownership concentration is a 
response to poor legal protection is also validated by the results. The more 
investment opportunities lead to more concentration of ownership and the 
ownership concentration is significantly diluted as the firm size expands. The 
findings are consistent with theoretical argument claiming that family owners, 
foreign owners and bring better governance and monitoring practices which is 
consistent with agency theory. The results suggest that firms which need more 
equity financing practice good governance.  The results show that firms with 
high growth and large in size are in more need of external finance. The 
relationship between external financing and ownership concentration is 
negative. The results reveal that the firms which practice good governance, with 
concentrated ownership, need more external finance which have more profitable 
investment opportunities and are larger in size are valued higher. The interaction 
term of any variable with law enforcement term are not significant in any model 
suggesting that firm performance is not affected by rule of law in countries 
where legal environment is weak. These results adds an important link to the 
explanation of the consequences weak legal environment for external financing, 
corporate valuation and corporate governance. The results show that Corporate 
Governance Code 2002 potentially improves the governance and decision 
making process of firms listed at KSE. 
 
JEL classification: G3 F3 
Keywords:  Ownership Concentration, Corporate Governance, Firm 









Good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic 
development by enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their 
access to outside capital. In emerging markets good corporate governance serves 
a number of public policy objectives. It reduces vulnerability of the financial 
crises, reinforcement property rights; reduces transaction cost and cost of capital 
and leads to capital market development. Corporate governance concerns the 
relationship among the management, board of directors, controlling 
shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. In Pakistan, the 
publication of the SECP Corporate Governance Code 2002 for publicly listed 
companies has made it an important area of research of corporate sector. 
A corporate governance system is comprised of a wide range of practices 
and institutions, from accounting standards and laws concerning financial 
disclosure, to executive compensation, to size and composition of corporate 
boards. A corporate governance system defines who owns the firm, and dictates 
the rules by which economic returns are distributed among shareholders, 
employees, managers, and other stakeholders. As such, a county's corporate 
governance regime has deep implications for firm organisation, employment 
systems, trading relationships, and capital markets. Thus, changes in Pakistani 
system of corporate governance are likely to have important consequences for 
the structure and conduct of country business. 
In its broadest sense, corporate governance refers to a complementary set 
of legal, economic, and social institutions that protect the interests of a 
corporation’s owners. In the Anglo-American system of corporate governance 
these owners are shareholders. The concept of corporate governance presumes a 
fundamental tension between shareholders and corporate managers [Berle and 
Means  (1932) and Jensen and Meckling  (1976)]. While the objective of a 
corporation’s shareholders is a return on their investment, managers are likely to 
have other goals, such as the power and prestige of running a large and powerful 
organisation, or entertainment and other perquisites of their position. In this 
situation, managers’ superior access to inside information and the relatively 
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powerless position of the numerous and dispersed shareholders, mean that 
managers are likely to have the upper hand. The researchers have offered a 
number of solutions for this agency problem between shareholders and 
managers which fall under the categories of incentive alignment, monitoring, 
and discipline. Incentives of managers and shareholders can be aligned through 
practices such as stock options or other market-based compensation [Fama and 
Jensen (1983a)]. Monitoring by an independent and engaged board of directors 
assures that managers behave in the best interests of the shareholders [Fama and 
Jensen  (1983)]. Chief Executive Officer (CEO)’s who fail to maximise 
shareholder interests can be removed by concerned boards of directors, and a 
firm that neglects shareholder value is disciplined by the market through hostile 
takeover
1 [Jensen and Ruback (1983)].  
The code of corporate governance introduced by SECP in early 2002 is 
the major step in corporate governance reforms in Pakistan. The code includes 
many recommendations in line with international good practice. The major areas 
of enforcement include reforms of board of directors in order to make it 
accountable to all shareholders and better disclosure including improved internal 
and external audits for listed companies. However, the code’s limited provisions 
on director’s independence remain voluntary and provide no guidance on 
internal controls, risk management and board compensation policies. 
The main focus of this study is to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate performance, corporate ownership, 
corporate financing for publicly listed Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) firms. 
Therefore, we attempt to identify the relationship between corporate governance 
proxies and firm value in our sample  of KSE firms. This emphasises the 
importance of legal rules and the quality of their enforcement. In Pakistan, with 
traditionally low dispersion of ownership, the primary methods to solve agency 
problems are the legal protection of minority investors, the  use of boards as 
monitors of senior management, and an active market for corporate control. In 
contrast to developed markets in Pakistan corporate governance is characterised 
by lesser reliance on capital markets and outside investors, but stronger reliance 
on large inside investors and financial institutions to achieve efficiency in the 
corporate sector. In this case, outside (smaller) investors face the risk of 
expropriation in the form of wealth transfers to larger shareholders.  
According to Shliefer and Vishny (1997) corporate governance 
mechanisms are economic and legal institutions that can be altered through the 
political process. As regards governance reform, product market competition 
would force firms to minimise costs, and as part of this cost minimisation to 
adopt rules, including corporate governance mechanisms, enabling them to raise 
external capital at the lowest cost in the long run. On this evolutionary theory of 
                                                 
1A takeover which goes against the wishes of the target company’s management and board 
of directors.  
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economic change [Alchian (1950); Stigler (1958)], competition would take care 
of corporate governance. 
Corporate governance in agency theory perspective is referred to as 
separation of ownership and control [Barle and Means (1932)]. There are two 
most common approaches to corporate governance to protect investors’ rights. 
First approach is to give investors power through legal protection from 
expropriation by managers. Protection of minority rights and legal prohibitions 
against managerial self-dealing are examples of such mechanisms. The second 
major approach is ownership by large investors (concentrated ownership): 
matching significant cash flow rand control rights. Most corporate governance 
mechanisms used in the world-including large share holdings, relationship 
banking, and even takeovers- can be viewed as examples of large investors 
exercising their power. We discuss how large investors reduce agency costs. 
While large investors still rely on the legal system, they do not need as many 
rights as the small investors do to protect their interests. For this reason, 
corporate governance is typically exercised by large investors. Despite its 
common use, concentrated ownership has its costs as well, which can be best 
described as potential expropriation by large investors of other small investors 
and stakeholders in the firm [Shliefer and Vishny (1997)]. 
 
1.2.  Objective of the Study 
The main focus of the study is to investigate does corporate governance 
matters in Pakistan equity market? What are its implications for corporate 
valuation, corporate, ownership and corporate financing? 
The first dimension of this issue is measuring the corporate governance in 
Pakistan. Corporate governance is interpreted as mechanism–both institutional and 
market based, that induces the self-interested managers (controllers of the firm) to 
make decisions that maximise the value of the firm to its shareholders (owners of 
the firm) [OECD (1999)]. The aim of these mechanisms is to reduce agency costs 
that arise from principle agent problem; and they could be internal and/or external 
in nature  [Klapper and Love  (2002)]. Internal mechanism deals with the 
composition of the board of directors, such as proportion of independent outside 
directors, distinction of CEO and chairperson etc. another important mechanism is 
ownership structure, or the degree at which the ownership by managers obvious 
trade-off between alignment and entrenchment effects. External mechanism on the 
other hand rely on takeover market in addition to regulatory system, where as the 
take over market act as a treat to existing controllers in that it enable outsiders to 
seek control of the firm if bad corporate governance results in significant gap 
between potential and actual value of the firm. So given these mechanisms, it is 
investigated that the legal system is the only way to ensure good corporate 
governance. It is also examined that effective presence of these mechanisms 
positively associated with firm value.   
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The second dimension of this issue is to investigate the determinants of 
concentrated form of ownership structure in Pakistan and its affect on firm 
performance. The reason is that when the legal framework does not offer 
sufficient protection for the outside investors, entrepreneurs and original owners 
are forced to maintain large position in their companies which results in 
concentrated form of ownership [La Porta, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999)]. 
The third dimension of this study is to assess the determinants of firms to 
raise external finance through equity and to examine that the firms that rely 
more on external financing sources are performing better.  
 
1.3. Organisation of the Study 
Rest of the study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides overview of 
corporate governance in Pakistan and it also discuses the data used in the 
subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 measures the corporate governance by using 22 
factors which constructs aggregate corporate governance index, and this index is 
divided in to three sub-indices. This chapter also discusses the determinants of 
corporate governance in Pakistan. In Chapter 5, the determinants of ownership 
structure are explored. The effect of ownership structure with firm performance 
is also investigated. The identity of owners is then related to firm value. In the 
Chapter 6 examines the factors that influence the need of external finance in 
Pakistan and its effect on firm value. Chapter 7 concludes the study. 
 
Chapter 2:  OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
IN PAKISTAN 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
Corporate governance matters for the financial development by 
increasing the flow of capital to the capital market. East Asian financial crisis 
attract serious attention to importance of corporate governance in developing 
countries. The OECD has established a set of corporate governance principles in 
1999 that have become the core template for assessing a country’s corporate 
governance arrangements. 
La Porta, et al. (2000) Defined, “Corporate governance is, to a certain 
extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves 
against expropriation by the insiders.” They define “the insiders” as both 
managers and controlling shareholders. 
“Corporate governance comprises the private and public institutions (both 
formal and informal) which together govern the relationship between those who 
manage corporations and those who invest resources in corporations. These 
institutions typically include a country’s corporate laws, securities regulations, 
stock-market listing requirements, accepted business practices and prevailing 
business ethics” [Omran (2004)]. Thus, changes in Pakistani system of corporate  
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governance are likely to have important consequences for the structure and 
conduct of country business. 
The issue of Corporate Governance of banks has also fundamental 
importance for emerging Economies. SBP restructured the regulatory 
framework governing the commercial  banking industry and issued some 
guidelines for corporate governance. The study of Kalid and Hanif (2005) 
provides an overview of development in the banking sector and measures of 
corporate governance in Pakistan. Their study observes that SBP organised its 
role as a regulator and supervisor and make the central bank relatively more 
effectively in recent years. Moreover, the legal and regulatory structure 
governing the role and functions of commercial banks has been restructured. 
However, as the process of corporate governance of banks in Pakistan is very 
recent, not enough information is available to make an assessment of the impact 
of these policies such as an evaluation of the improvement in bank efficiency or 
reduction in bank defaults. 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan issued Code of 
Corporate Governance in March 2002 in order to strengthen the regulatory 
mechanism and its enforcement. The code of corporate governance is the major 
step in corporate governance reforms in Pakistan. The code includes many 
recommendations in line with international good practice. The major areas of 
enforcement include reforms of board of directors in order to make it 
accountable to all shareholders and better disclosure including improved internal 
and external audits for listed companies. However, the code’s limited provisions 
on director’s independence remain voluntary and provide no guidance on 
internal controls, risk management and board compensation policies. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. The institutional framework is 
presented in  Section 2. Section 3 briefly reviews the code of corporate 
governance of Pakistan.  The assessment of the code of corporate governance is 
provided in Section 4. Section 5 explores corporate governance under ownership 
structure of Pakistan. Section 6 concludes our discussion. 
 
2.2.  Institutional Framework 
East Asian financial crisis and corporate failure like Enron have brought 
to light the importance of an effective institutional framework. In order to the 
improve value of the corporate governance for finance development of a country 
attention must be given to strengthen the institutional framework. That strong 
institutional framework would help in effective corporate management and for 
developing advanced capital markets that increases shareholder value and 
enhance corporate governance.  
The establishment of the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
represents an important milestone in the development of the regulatory 
framework of the capital market in Pakistan. The S ecurities and Exchange  
 
6 
Commission of Pakistan (The Commission) was established in pursuance of the 
Securities and Exchanges Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 and became 
operational on 1st January, 1999. It succeeds the Corporate Law Authority 
(CLA), which w as a Government department attached to the Ministry of 
finance. It was initially concerned with the regulation of corporate sector and 
capital market. In accordance with the approved Corporate Plan, the 
Commission has been organised into the following six Divisions: 
• Company Law Division. 
• Securities Market Division. 
• Specialised Companies Division. 
• Finance and Admin Division. 
• Human Resource and Training Division. 
• Insurance Division. 
Each of division is divided into Departments and Wings for effective 
administration. The Departments are headed by Executive Directors, with 
oversight by commissioners.
2  
The continuing challenges of the Commission include: based on the 
regulatory principles develop a modern and efficient corporate sector and capital 
market; based on international legal standards. In order to foster principles of 
good governance in the corporate sector and protect investors through 
responsive policy measure and enforcement practice develop an efficient and 
dynamic regulatory body. 
The SECP is governed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan Act, 1997 which encompasses the constitution of the Commission 
appointment and terms and conditions of the Chairman and Commissioners, 
functions and powers of the Commission and financial arrangements. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan is administering many laws. 
These includes: insurance Ordinance, 2000 (previously as Insurance Act, 1938; 
The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act,1997;  The company 
ordinance, 1984 (amended and implemented in 2002); The Modaraba 
Companies and Modaraba (Floatation and Control) Ordinance, 1980; The 
Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969. 
The Policy Board is established by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan Act, 1997 in order to provide guidance to the Commission in all matters 
relating to the functions of the Commission and formulation of the policies. The 
Policy Board consists of maximum nine members appointed by the Federal 
Government. Out of nine members five members would be as ex-officio members 
and five members would be from private sector.  
                                                 




A number of significant amendments in corporate laws were made with 
the objective of updating these laws to keep pace with developments in the 
corporate sector. These include: amendm ents in Securities and Exchange 
Ordinance, 1969; Modaraba Companies and Modaraba (floatation and control) 
Ordinance, 1980;  Companies Ordinance, 1984; the securities and exchange 
commission of Pakistan Act, 1997. 
Amendments in company ordinance, 1984, suggested by the SECP have 
been approved by the cabinet in 2002. The amendments mainly relates to 
incorporation of single member company. Because of this amendment an 
individual trader or manufacturer would be able to establish a company having 
its own separate entity and thus enjoying the privilege of limited liability. This 
new concept will help for expansion of a discipline corporate sector. The 
companies have been provided the period of four months in order to present 
audited account before shareholders. The private companies which convert into 
public companies after one year of their incorporation have been exempted to 
hold their statutory meetings. The new amendments make it compulsory that 
copies of minutes of meetings will be provided to every director within 14 days 
of the date of such meetings. Appointment of a whole time qualified company 
secretary by a listed company has been made mandatory for efficient corporate 
compliance. Through these new amendments a company may remove its 
auditors through special resolution mean by the majority of 75 percent. 
However, appointment of new auditors in place of removed auditors will be 
made with the approval of the Commission. Quorum of a general meeting of a 
public listed company has been increased from three members to ten members 
present in person representing not less than 25 percent of total voting power. 
Stock markets are important as a source of investment finance for 
corporations in developing countries.  At present, three stock exchanges are 
functioning in Pakistan, namely Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), Lahore Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and Islamabad Stock Exchange (ISE).  Trading on all the three 
stock exchanges is fully automated (for performance see Table 2.4). The three 
stock exchanges are also linked to the Central Depository System (CDS). 
Since the last decade, the capital markets of Pakistan have witnessed a 
substantial growth leading to a manifold increase in the trading volume. The 
custody and safe keeping of physical certificates required maintenance of huge 
vaults by the individuals and institutions and the physical settlement of 
certificates was no longer feasible. Moreover, the manual system was also 
plagued by lengthy delays, risks of damage, forgeries and considerable time and 
capital investment. Central  Depository Company of Pakistan Limited (CDC) 
was incorporated in 1993 and subsequently became operational in 1997 to 
manage and operate the Central Depository System (CDS). CDS is an electronic 
book entry system to record and transfer securities. Electronic book entry means 
that the securities do not physically change hands and the transfer from one 
client account to another takes place electronically. CDC provides the backbone  
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for smooth and efficient settlement operations of the Pakistani capital market. 
Almost all of the total settlement of the stock exchanges is now done through the 
CDS.
3 
To encourage corporate governance the institute of corporate governance 
of Pakistan a non-profit organisation is established under Section 42 of company 
ordinance, 1984. It is public private partnership. Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan, three stock exchanges and 
banking and insurance institutions are founding members of this institution. 
In 2006 PICG in collaboration with IFC and State Bank of Pakistan 
conducted a conference of banking reforms in Pakistan. The conference aspired 
to create increased understanding of the need for good governance among 
Pakistan’s banking sector. Charged  
 
Table 2.1 
 Year Wise Distribution of Companies 
Financial Year  Incorporated Companies  No. of Equity Issue to Public (Rs bill) 
1998-99  968  0.44 
1999-00  1074  0.00 
2000-01  1169  2.03 
2001-02  1183  1.99 
2002-03  1553  5.97 
2003-04  2207  0.98 
2004-05  3078  48.88 
2005-06  6186  24.34 
2006-07  4703  9.60 
Source:  Annual Report of SECP 2006-07.  
 
Table 2.2 
Provincial Wise Distribution of Companies 







Punjab  43  39  46 
Sindh  39  29  34 
NWFP  11  9  6 
Baluchistan  1  4  1 
Islamabad Territory  6  19  13 
Source: Annual Report of SECP 2005, 2006, 2007. 
                                                 




Capitalisation Break Down for the Year 2007 






Com  SMCs  Total  Percentage 
Up to 10,000  1  448  20,607  373  24,429  42.87 
100,000 to 500,000  1  343  7,037  100  7,481  14.97 
500,001to1,000,000  0  105  4,566  59  4,730  9.46 
1,000,001 to 10,000,000  34  343  10,804  48  11,229  22.47 
10,000,000 to 100,000,000  226  662  3,168  28  4,084  8.17 
1000,000,001 to 500,000,000  236  224  319  2  799  1.60 
500,000,001 to 1,000,000,000  45  32  29  0  106  0.21 
1,000,000,001 and above  69  36  18  0  123  0.25 
Source: Annual Report of SECP 2007. 
   
Table 2.4 
KSE Performance at Glance 
  2004  2005  2006  2007 
KSE 100 Index  5,279.18  7,450.12  9,981.40  13,772.26 
Market Capitalisation (Rs bill)  1,421.58  2,068.19  2,801.28  4,019.46 
Turnover (Shares Mill)  389  343  321.10  367.96 
Source: Annual Report of SECP 2004,2005,2006,2007. 
 
2.3.  Code of the Corporate Governance 
Many new financial instruments are introduced by the SECP in order to 
enhance corporate governance. The code of corporate governance was issued in 
March 2002 by the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan in order to 
improve transparency, governance and protect the interest of the investors by 
improving the disclosure in financial reporting of companies. The Code of Corporate 
Governance is the results of the joint effort of Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan and Chartered of Pakistan in collaboration with Institute of Cost and 
Management Accountants of Pakistan (ICMAP) and three Stock Exchanges. The 
code includes many recommendations in line with international good practice. 
All listed companies publish and circulate a statement along with their 
annual reports to set out the status of their compliance with the best practices of 
corporate governance. The Code primarily aims to establish a system whereby a 
company is directed and controlled by its directors in compliance with the best 
practice so as to safeguard the interest of diversified stakeholders. It proposes to 
restructure the composition of the board of directors in order to introduce broad 
based representation by minority shareholders and by executive and non-
executive directors.
4’
5 The Code emphasised openness and transparency in 
                                                 
4All listed companies shall encourage effective representation of independent non-executive 
directors, including those representing minority interest, on their Boards of Directors so that the 
Board as a group include core competencies considered relevant in the context of each listed 
company (Clause (i) of Code of Corporate governance, 2002). 
5Implementation of the clause of non-executive directors is voluntary not mandatory.  
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corporate affairs and the decision making process and requires directors to 
discharge their fiduciary responsibilities in the larger interest of all stakeholders 
in a transparent, informed, diligent, and timely manner. The salient feature of the 
Code includes setting up of audit committees and internal audit functions by all 
listed companies [Code of Corporate Governance (2002)]. 
In August 2002 SECP launch a project on corporate governance in 
collaboration with UNDP and Economic Affairs Division of Government of 
Pakistan. This project is launched mainly for the implementation of code of 
corporate governance and strong regulatory frame work for the corporate sector 
in Pakistan.  
In 2007 the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, International 
Financial Corporation (IFC) and Institute of Corporate G overnance of Pakistan 
(PINCG) conducted a Survey on “Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan”. 
The survey targeted the local listed and large local non-listed companies and 
financial sector institutions. Among the key findings in the survey, a major one 
is the need for creating awareness amongst the directors of companies about the 
benefits of the Code, so that they could go further than the tick-box approach to 
implementing the Code, and understand and implement the Code in its true 
spirit. Security and E xchange Commission of Pakistan developed a board 
development series (BDS) with the help of IFC. PICG conducted many 
workshops for the purpose of understanding corporate governance and 
responsibilities of boards of directors. 
 
2.4.  Assessment of Corporate Governance 
The SECP is enforcing corporate governance regulations SECP is 
receiving technical assistance from Asian Development Bank to improve 
corporate governance enforcement programme and also from World Bank is 
build awareness and training. Other elements of enforcement regime are not so 
strong ICAP has some self regulatory function and stock exchanges are lacked 
the resources and expertise to effective monitor implementation of the code.  
Karachi Stock Exchange has set up a Board Committee on the Code  of 
Corporate Governance and a unit in the Company Affairs Department to 
monitor compliance with the code. 
The basic shareholders rights are protected in Pakistan at least laws in 
book. The registration is secure and dematerialised through Central Depository 
Committee (CDC). Shareholders can demand a variety of information directly 
from the company and have a clear right to participate in Annual General 
Meetings (AGM). Directors are elected using a form of cumulative voting and 
can remove through share holder resolution. The changes in the company 
articles, increasing authorised capital and sale of major corporate assets are 
require shareholders approval. While more effective enforcement contributed to 
improve compliance, some companies do not hold annual general meetings  
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(AGMs) or hold in places where it is difficult for shareholders to reach. The law 
also does not support voting by post or electronically. The concentrated control 
limits and influence of minority shareholders, and effectively reduce their 
protection from abuse. When families dominate the shareholders meeting and 
board, director’s accountability to other shareholders become critical and 
currently in Pakistan this accountability is absent in many companies. The 
shareholder recording process for  share hold in the CDC works effectively. 
However, although the registration’s role has been reduced by the CDC’s 
operations, some inefficiency is still there. Some companies do not pay dividend 
on time, and take longer than 5 days to re-register share in t he name of 
depository. The annual reports of SECP suggest that the percentage of 
companies paying dividends is 35 percent and shareholders can complain SECP 
about non payment of dividends. 
The quality of disclosure has improved over last six years due to 
increasing monitoring role of the SECP and the requirement of code. 
Shareholders owning 10 percent or more of voting capital disclose their 
ownership and the annual report includes the pattern for major shareholdings. 
However pyramid structure, cross holdings and the absence of joint action make 
it difficult for outsiders to understand the ownership structure of companies, 
especially in case of business groups. 
The family owned companies are typically managed by owners 
themselves. In case of state owned enterprises and multinationals there is often 
direct relationship between state/foreign owners and management again 
bypassing the boards. Many important corporate decisions are not made on 
Board AGMs level. The code explicitly mentions director’s duties to act with 
objective an independent judgment and in the best interest of company. In 
business groups boards are dominated by executive and non-executive members 
of controlling family and by proxy directors appointed to act on their behalf. 
Inter-looking directorships are often used to retain majority control. Family 
dominated boards are less able to protect minority shareholder’s rights and risk a 
loss of competitiveness as other boards become more professional. 
The code strengthen the role of non-executive directors by restricting the 
percentage of executive director to 75 percent in non-financial firms and 
recommending that institutional investor in 75 percent in non-financial firms and 
recommending institutional investor be representation. However given the 
dominant ownership structure, this does not present controlling families from 
having disproportionate representation on the board.  
“The adoption of the Corporate Governance Code has improved the 
overall corporate structure and business environment by making the companies 
more responsible, and by ensuring transparency and accountability in the 
corporate and financial reporting framework. The inclusion of non-executive 
directors on the board is a big step forward as it will discourage the tendency of 
protecting personnel interests and motives at the expense of the minority  
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shareholders. Moreover, the addition of the non-executive members has 
improved decision-making process, which is not only slow previously, but also 
opaque due to the lack of interest of the board of directors to meet as and when 
required”, Rias and Saeed (2005). In the view of  Syed (2005) the publication of 
quarterly results by firms enables the investors to make better investment 
decision. Under the Code, listed companies shall share with SECP and stock 
exchange, all information that will affect the market price of its shares. The 
disclosure of material information ensures transparent trading. 
 
2.5. Corporate Governance under Concentrated Ownership  
Corporate ownership is very concentrated in Pakistan (see Table 2.5).  
The mean value of ownership concentration for the 60 companies for the year 
2003-2007 shows that more than 50 percent of the shares are owned by top 3 
shareholders. 
In Pakistan the main owners are local family-controlled business groups 
and the families behind them, the state, and the affiliates of multinational 
corporations (see Table 6). According to Gani and Ashraf (2005), “The business 
groups in Pakistan (previously known as twenty-two families) are informal 
combinations of legally independent business entities run by families. The 
family patriarch is the dominant shareholder and manager whereas the 
immediate and distant family-members help operate various firms within the 
business group”. 
In many countries pyramidal ownership  structures, which dominant 
shareholders and business groups use to enforce their control over firms within 
the group, are common. Pyramid ownership structures make it possible to 
control some firms even with a very small share of their total capital. The results 
of Gani and Ashraf (2005) suggest that for the perspective of external 
shareholder firms that are affiliated with business groups have lower 
transparency and weaker corporate governance mechanism. Consequently, the 
market participants discount the value of group firms even though they are more 
profitable than non-group firms. They interpret this evidence that the business-
group mechanism in Pakistan makes it easier to expropriate minority 
shareholders than non group firms. 
 
Table 2.5 
Ownership Concentration of 50 Random Companies for Pakistan for 2003-2007 
  Mean  Median  Minimum   Maximum  S.D 
T3  52.0  50.70  2.5  96.8  21.0 
T5  62.39  64.23  3.5  99.00  21.17 
T3: Percentage of ownership shares held by top three shareholders. 




Inventors Composition in Listed Private Companies 
(Percentage Shares Owned by an Investor Type) 
Investor Type    Textile  Non-Textile 
Direct Holding by Family Members  29.3  9.1 
NIT/ICP  8.4  11.1 
Financial Institutions  5.1  8.2 
Foreign Investors  1.9  14.3 
Joint Stock Companies  23.2  16.9 
Associated Companies of the Controlling Family  17.4  21.4 
Source:  Cheema, Bari, and Siddique (2003). 
 
Table 2.7 
Ownership Composition of Pakistan’s Top 40 Listed Companies 
  % of Top 40 
Companies 
% of Top 40s Market 
Capitalisation 
Ownership Type  All  Non-financial  All  Non-financial 
Local Private Family-Based  52.5  59.0  30.2  29.8 
Government  12.5  12.0  36.5  36.8 
Semi-Government  22.5  14.0  16.3  15.6 
MNCs  12.5  15.0  17.0  18.0 
Source: Cheema, Bari, and Siddque (2003). 
 
Cheema, Bari, and Siddique (2003) summaries the corporate growth 
history of Pakistan, providing an overview of the ownership, state of financial 
market, and market dynamics. They highlight the salient feature of ownership 
structure of Pakistan’s top 40 listed companies in Pakistan (Table 2.6).  
 
2.6. Corporate Governance in South Asia 
The process of improving the best practice of corporate governance in 
South Asia is ongoing. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and India recognise the importance 
of corporate governance. India issued Code of Corporate Governance in 1998, 
Pakistan issued Code of Corporate Governance in 2002, and Sri Lanka has also 
Code of Corporate Governance. Issuance of Code increased the transparency in 
the corporate sector of these countries. 
The four country comparative analysis by Sobhan and Wendy (2003) 
provide an immensely rich resource which can be mined for numerous lessons 
of experience and critical factors for corporate governance. They draw many 
important lessons from the four country reports on corporate governance. In 
their view corporate governance cannot be introduced in isolation from a range 
of other reforms (macro-economic, micro-economic, accounting, legal, banking 
and institutional)  – nor can these other reforms achieve all their objectives 
without corporate governance initiatives. Moreover there is the need to monitor 
the trends in different sectors of the markets. From the country reports they also  
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draw lesson that critical importance of the company and contract laws and the 
efficacy of the legal system should also be recognise. It is notable that all the 
countries have developed special commercial courts of one sort or another to 
handle the commercial disputes, but the reports all generate a sense of gloom, 
almost of despair, when it comes to the efficacy of the law, and of the need to 
modernise bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings. 
The OECD and the World Bank Group have combined their efforts to 
promote policy dialogue on corporate governance and have established Regional 
Corporate Governance Round tables and assessment of corporate governance in 
close partnership with national policy-makers, regulators and market 
participants. It draws lessons from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, assesses 
progress and remaining challenges, and formulates common policy objectives 
and a practical reform agenda for improving corporate governance in Asia.
6  
India has a sizeable corporate sector registered as closely- or widely-held 
companies under the Companies Act.  Table 8 gives the data for basic statistic of 
corporate sector of India for1997-2000. “Since the first Corporate Governance 
ROSC assessment dated July 31, 2000, a series of legal and regulatory reforms 
have transformed the Indian corporate governance framework and improved the 
level of responsibility/accountability of insiders, fairness in the treatment of 
minority shareholders and stakeholders, board practices, and transparency In 
particular, the securities regulator introduced a corporate governance clause in 
the  listing agreement that clarified many issues. Recent efforts to strengthen 
enforcement have enhanced investors’ trust in the market. The financial press is 
increasingly reporting violations of shareholder rights. These are positive drivers 
of change. However, enforcement and implementation of laws and regulations 
remain important challenges.” ROSC (2004).  
In Bangladesh lending institutions are broadly categorised into banks and 
non-banking financial institutions. Overall performance measures of the stock 
exchange show low trading volume, intermittent and very few new offerings, 
and declining valuations Sobhan and Wendy (2003).
7  “The Bangladesh 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Bangladesh have demonstrated a keen interest in implementing International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA) to 
upgrade the quality of corporate financial reporting. Various steps have already 
been taken; however, further results will require the design and implementation 
of a comprehensive action plan on accountancy reform. The accounting and 
auditing practices in Bangladesh suffer from institutional weaknesses in 
regulation, compliance, and enforcement of standards and rules. The preparation 
of financial statements and conduct of audits, in many cases, are not consistent 
with internationally acceptable standards and practices. Better-qualified 
                                                 
6See White Papers on corporate governance in Asia, 2003. 
7See Table 2.10.  
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graduates generally do not join the accounting profession because it is not 
viewed as a stepping-stone to a rewarding and prestigious career. The out-of-
date legal requirements, widespread non-compliance with accounting and 
auditing standards, ineffective enforcement mechanism, poor quality accounting 
education and training, and inadequate adherence to professional ethics have 
contributed to the weakness of the financial reporting regime”, ROSC (2003). 
 
Table 2.8 
Basic Statistics of Corporate Sector of India 
  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Number of Companies 
   Closely held (Private limited) 
 


















Paid-up Capital (Rs Billion) 
   Closely held (Private limited) 
 



















   Number of Companies 
 

















Source:  Sobhan and Werner (2003). 
 
Table 2.9 
Types of Financial Institutions in Bangladesh 
Type of Financial Institution  Number of Institutions 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions  28 
State-owned Commercial Banks  4 
Specialised and Development Banks  11 
Private Commercial Banks  26 
Islamic Private Commercial Banks  02 
Foreign Commercial Banks  10 
Source: Sobhan and Wendy (2003). 
 
Table 2.10 
Dhaka Stock Exchange Select Statistics 
  1999  2000  2001  2002 
No. of Listed Companies  221  230  231  239 
Market Capitalisation ($ Mill)  870  1,165  1,176  1,184 
Market Cap as % of GDP  2.04%  2.65%  2.52%   
DSE All Share Price Index   647.95  853.75  829.61  848.41 
Source:  Sobhan and Wendy (2003).  
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2.7.  Summary and Conclusion 
The issue of corporate governance is important for developing countries 
because it is central to financial and economic development of a country. 
Pakistan has develop good corporate governance laws but with poor 
implementation of these laws together with political instability that adversely 
affect corporate governance. Code of corporate governance is issued by SECP in 
March 2002. The adoption of the Corporate Governance Code has improved the 
overall corporate structure and business environment. The quality of disclosure 
has improved over last four years due to increasing monitoring role of the SECP 
and the requirement of code. 
In Pakistan the main owners are local family-controlled business groups 
and the families behind them, the state, and the affiliates of multinational 
corporations. Ownership is very concentrated in the few hands of large families. 
These families control ownership shares through pyramids and  tunnelling. 
Business groups have lower transparency and weaker corporate governance 
mechanism.  Pyramid ownership structures make it possible to control some 
firms even with a very small share of their total capital. The basic shareholders 
rights are protected in Pakistan at least laws in book. The registration is secure 
and dematerialised through Central Depository Committee (CDC). 
 
Chapter 3:  DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the developed markets the subject of corporate governance is well 
explored as a significant focus of economics and finance research but there is 
also a growing interest across emerging markets in this area. In Pakistan, the 
publication of the Corporate Governance Code 2002 by SECP for publicly listed 
companies has made it an important area of research of corporate sector.   
A corporate governance system is comprised of a wide range of practices 
and institutions, from accounting standards and laws concerning financial 
disclosure, to executive compensation, to size and composition of corporate 
boards. A corporate governance system defines who owns the firm, and dictates 
the rules by which economic returns are distributed among shareholders, 
employees, managers, and other stakeholders. As such, a county’s corporate 
governance regime has deep implications for firm organisation, employment 
systems, trading relationships, and capital markets. Thus, changes in Pakistani 
system of corporate governance are likely to have important consequences for 
the structure and conduct of country business. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section briefly reviews the literature 
in this area. The measurement of corporate governance index and its sub-indices 
is presented in Section 3. The Section 4 examines the determinants of corporate 
governance in case of Pakistan equity market. Last section concludes the study.  
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3.2. Review of Previous Literature 
The assessment of the corporate governance for developed markets is 
well researched area. Studies have shown that good governance practices have 
led the significant i ncrease in the economic value added of firms, higher 
productivity and lower risk of systematic financial failure for countries. It has 
now become an important area of research in emerging markets as well.  
For US Firms a broad measure of Corporate Governance Gov-Score is 
prepared by Brown and Caylor (2004) with 51 factors, 8 sub categories for 2327 
firms based on dataset of Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS). Their findings 
indicate that better governed firms are relatively more profitable, more valuable 
and pay more cash to their shareholders. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) use 
Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) data, and conclude that firms 
with fewer shareholder rights have lower firm valuations and lower stock 
returns. They classify 2 4 governance factors into five groups: tactics for 
delaying hostile takeover, voting rights, director/officer protection, other 
takeover defenses, and state laws. Most of these factors are anti-takeover 
measures so G -Index is effectively an index of anti-takeover protection rather 
than a broad index of governance. Their findings show that firms with stronger 
shareholders rights have higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, 
lowest capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions. 
In past few years corporate governance has become an important area of 
research in Pakistan. Cheema, et al. (2003) suggests that corporate governance 
can play a significant role for Pakistan to attract foreign direct investment and 
mobilise greater saving through capital provided the corporate governance 
system is compatible with the objective of raising external equity capital through 
capital markets. The corporate structure of Pakistan is characterised as 
concentrated family control, interlocking directorships, cross-shareholdings and 
pyramid structures. The concern is that reforms whose main objective is 
minority shareholder protection may dampen profit maximising incentives for 
families without providing offsetting benefits in the form of equally efficient 
monitoring by minority shareholders. If this happens the reform may end up 
creating sub optimal incentives for profit maximisation by families. They argue 
that a crucial challenge for policy-makers is to optimise the dual objectives of 
minority shareholder protection and the maintenance of profit-maximising 
incentives for family controllers. There is a need for progressive corporations to 
take a lead in the corporate governance reform effort as well. 
Rais and Saeed (2005) analyse the Corporate Governance Code 2002 in 
the light of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) framework and its 
enforcement and application in Pakistan in order to understand the dynamics of 
public decision making and assess the efficacy of the regulation policy of SECP 
in the arena of corporate governance. The analysis shows that though the listed 
companies are gearing themselves up to adopt the Code, there are some  
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constraints, and reservations about the way it was drafted and implemented. The 
study by Ghani,  et al. (2002)  examines business groups and their impact on 
corporate governance in Pakistan for non-financial firms listed on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange of Pakistan for 1998-2002. Their evidence indicates that 
investors view the business-group as a mechanism to expropriate minority 
shareholders. On the other hand, the comparative financial performance results 
suggest that business groups in Pakistan are efficient economic arrangements 
that substitute for missing or inefficient outside institutions and markets. The 
study by  Ashraf and G hani (2005) examines the origins, growth, and the 
development of accounting practices and disclosures in Pakistan and the factors 
that influenced them. They document that lack of investor protection (e.g., 
minority rights protection, insider trading protection), judicial inefficiencies, and 
weak enforcement mechanisms are more critical factors than are cultural factors 
in explaining the state of accounting in Pakistan. They conclude that it is the 
enforcement mechanisms that are paramount in improving the q uality of 
accounting in developing economies. 
Mir and Nishat (2004) and Shaheen and Nishat have done rating of 
corporate governance based on annual reports and survey data respectively for 
the year 2004 and relate this governance score with firm value. Javid and Iqbal 
(2007) used panel data from annual reports for 2003 to 2006 to measure factors 
of corporate governance. All these studies come to the conclusion that better 
governance practices increase the value of the firm. The International Financial 
Corporation (IFC), SECP and Institute of Corporate Governance, Karachi 
undertook a survey to awareness the corporate governance for the year 2006. 
There is an increasing interest in analysing affect of corporate governance 
on stock market in Pakistan but many i ssues in this area are uncovered. In 
particular, firm-level corporate governance rating and its affect on the corporate 
valuation, corporate ownership and corporate financing are central issues of this 
area which needs in depth research. It is in this perspective this study aims to 
make contribution in the literature on corporate governance.  
 
3.3.  Corporate Governance Index 
It is expected that better corporate governance is correlated with better 
operating performance and higher market valuation in case of KSE listed firms. 
In order to construct corporate governance index for the firms listed on KSE, a 
broad, multifactor corporate governance rating is done which is based on the 
data obtained from the annual reports of the firms submitted to SECP. The index 
construction is as follows: for every firm, there are 22 governance proxies or 
indicators are selected,
8 these indicators are categorised into three main themes. 
The three categories or sub-indices consist of: eight factors for the board 
                                                 
8The list of these variables is given in the Appendix. Table A2.  
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composition and i ndependence index seven for ownership, shareholdings and 
seven for transparency, disclosure and audit. 
The weighting is in the construction of index is based on subjective 
judgments. The assigned priorities amongst and within each category is guided 
by empirical literature and financial experts in this area. The maximum score is 
100, then, a score of 100 is assigned if factor is observed, 80 if largely observed, 
50 for partially observed and 0 if it is not observed.
9 The average is taken out to 
arrive at the rating of one sub-index. By taking the average of three sub-indices 
we obtain CGI for a particular firm. 
Each sub-index comprises of series of factors leading to measure 
corporate governance. Board composition index captures board autonomy, 
structure and effectiveness. Autonomy is measured through various indicators of 
board independence including percentage of nominees, outside and independent 
directors on board, separation of CEO and chairman, a separate CFO (Corporate 
Financial Officer). The various measures of board effectiveness are chair CEO 
split, regularity of meetings, and attendance by outside board members, and 
creditor’s nominee on board. The separation of role of CEO and chair dilutes the 
power of CEO and increases board’s ability to properly execute the oversight 
judgment. It also critically evaluates executive directors and the presence of 
non-executive member on board reduces the influence of management on the 
board. Moreover a higher proportion of outside directors
10 on the board lead to 
higher company performance. The CEO may find a smaller board more easily 
dominated and more manageable due to the potential for social cohesion [Shaw 
(1981)]. A large group of directors would require more time and effort on the 
part of CEO to build census for a given course of action. Therefore if the board 
is large, its independence is increased in the sense that the CEO’s ability to 
influence is diluted and it is more difficult for the CEO to dominate the board. 
There is also some evidence in favour of larger boards. Chaganli, Mahajam and 
Sharma (1983) have studied the relationship between board size and bankruptcy 
and have found that non-failed firms in their sample, tended to have larger 
boards then the failed firms. Thus larger boards may be more independent of 
management and that is the reason that the larger boards are associated with 
higher performance. 
The ownership and shareholdings is the second aspect of corporate 
governance. The purpose of this sub-index is to measure the degree to which the 
board a nd managers have incentives that align their interest with those of 
shareholders. The third sub-index deals with disclosures. It attempts to measure 
the public commitment of the firm to good governance. Components following 
                                                 
9This is based on the report of World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and 
Code (ROSC), Corporate Governance Country Assessment: Pakistan, June 2005.  
10Any member of a company’s board of directors, who is not an employee or shareholder in 
the company.  
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full disclosure of corporate governance practices, directors’ bibliography, and 
internal audit committee reduce information asymmetry and it is valued by 
investor [Klein, et al. (2005)].                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
3.4.  Determinants of Corporate Governance 
The purpose is to assess the factors that determine the corporate 
governance practices adopted by firms. It is expected that in case of Pakistan, 
variables such as concentration of ownership, need of external finance, 
profitable investment opportunities, and size of the firm are related to the firm’s 
decision to comply with the code of corporate governance. Ownership 
concentration is a substitute of weak investor protection [La Porta, et al. (1999)]. 
The more the concentration of ownership and larger the cash flow rights of large 
shareholders, the more is entrenched and more the large owners influence the 
decision-making process [Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmerman  (2004)]. The 
concentration of ownership is negatively related to quality of corporate 
governance practices. In some firms the entrepreneur founders who used their 
own resources and retained earnings to finance their firms and have significant 
ownership stakes in the listed firms. This issue is addressed by using ownership 
concentration by top five largest shareholders. The firms with greater need of 
external financing practice high quality governance [Durnev and Kim (2006); 
Rajan and Zingales (1998)]. It is expected that there is negative association 
between ownership concentration and corporate governance and positive 
relation between external financing needs and quality of corporate governance. 
Further, in countries with weak legal regimes firms have difficulty in raising 
external finance due to investors’ lack of trust in legal protection of their rights 
[La Porta,  et al.  (1998)]. In this study the significance of rule of law as 
determinant of corporate governance is analyzed. To assess influence of legal 
environment across the firm, this variable is introduced in interaction terms. To 
test the hypothesis that the quality of corporate governance is positively related 
to growth in investment opportunities, and negatively to concentration of 
ownership the model suggested by Dunev and Kim (2006) is estimated: 
 
it i i i
i i i i i i
Own Lw EF
Lw Size Inv Own EF CGI
e b
b b b b b a
+ +
+ + + + + =
* * 6
5 4 3 2 1     …  (3.1)           
 
Where  CGLi 
is a vector of corporate governance index,  Ownt is the 
concentration of ownership held by top five shareholders, EFi is external finance 
that is calculated by multiplying market capitalisation of each firm with 
percentage of shares that are not taken by the top five shareholders of each firm, 
Invi 
is investment opportunities measured by the past growth in sales, Lwi 
is rule 
of law that is used for the proxy of enforcement of law, and Sizei is measured by 
the log of total asset. ei  is random error term.  
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The model (3.1) develops the linkage between corporate governance and 
ownership concentration, need of external finance, quality of enforcement of law 
and other firm specific variables and interaction terms  [Durnev and Kim 
(2006)]. In the set of control variables which include size (natural logarithm of 
assets) and investment opportunities (average sale growth) are used in 
estimation. Firm size and growth control for potential advantages of scale and 
scope, market power and market opportunities. The leverage (long term 
debt/total assets) controls for different risk characteristics of firm.  Ownership 
concentration is expected to improve investor protection. In case of family 
ownership the entrepreneur have significant ownership stakes in the listed firms 
and use their own resources and retained earning to finance their firms, to 
capture concentration of ownership the percentage of ownership by top five 
largest shareholders is used.  
A growing firm with large need of external financing has more incentive 
to adopt better governance practices in an attempt to lower cost of capital 
[Klapper and Love (2003) and Gompers, et al.  (2003)]. The firms with more 
need of external finance would be more likely to choose better governance 
structure because firm’s insiders believe that better governance structure will 
further raise firm value they adopt good governance to signal that insider behave 
well and they can easily excess to external finances.  
 
3.5.  Estimation Technique 
The panel data estimation technique is used because by pooling cross-
section and time series the sample size increases. The panel data take account of 
the endogenity and control for the firm specific effects. The Generalised Method 
of Moments is also used suggested by Georgen,  et al. (2005). To obtain 
consistent estimates, the model is first differenced to estimate the fixed effects, 
then all right hand side variables in lag are used as instruments and thus 
eliminating inconsistency arising from endogenity [Arellano and Bond (1991)]. 
The consistency of GMM model depends on the validity of both of both the 
instruments and the assumption that the error terms do not  exhibit serial 
correlation. Therefore two specification tests, Sargan test of over-identifying 
restriction and test that error term is not serially correlated are performed. The 
failure to reject the null hypothesis in both tests gives support to GMM model 
[Arellano and Bond (1991)]. The following equation describes the relationship: 
it it it X Y m b a + + =             …  …  …  …  …  (3.2) 
Where Y and X have both i and t subscripts for i =1.2, N firms and t = 1, 2,…T 
time period. Y it represent the dependent variable in the model, X it contain set of 
explanatory variables. The previous empirical studies suggest that the 
Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) is more suitable method [Arellano and 
Bonds (1991)]. The lagged dependent variable is most likely to be correlated  
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with the firm specific effect and estimates using ordinary least square method 
(OLS) provided inconsistent and biased estimates. To get the consistent 
estimation, the model is first difference to estimate the fixed effect and then we 
use the instruments on the right hand side variable using their lagged values to 
estimate the inconsistency which can be arising from endogenity of the 
regressors.  
For panel data we have six years of data and 60 firms of Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE). The Arellano and Bonds (1991) suggest that the estimation 
from GMM is first difference; which removes the time invariant µi and leave the 
equations automatable by instrument as described by the following equation: 
Yit – Y it-1 = a + (yit –yit-2) + ß (x it –x it-1) + (µi -µi) + (vit –vit-1)   …  (3.3) 
Which leads us to assume that there is no serial correlation in the disturbance 
term e it and all the lagged level of variables can be used as valid instruments in 
the first difference equation. 
 
3.6.  Empirical Findings 
The model (3.1) develops the linkage between corporate governance and 
ownership concentration, need of external finance, quality of enforcement of law 
and other firm specific variables and interaction terms  [Durnev and K im 
(2006)]. Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of total corporate governance 
index CGIi  and its sub-indices, which are Board Composition (Boardi), 
Ownership and Shareholdings (Sharei) and Disclosure, Transparency and 
auditing (Disci).  
 
Table 3.1 
Summary Statistics of Corporate Governance Index 
  Mean  Max  Min  SD  CGI  Board  Rights  Disc 
CGI  54.30  70.42  30.89  7.99  1.00       
Board  55.58  87.50  25.00  16.02  0.62  1.00     
Share  46.97  78.57  7.14  16.10  0.57  0.11  1.00   
Disc  60.36  94.29  30.00  10.93  0.44  0.05  0.06  1.00 
 
This Table 3.1 provides the summary statistics of distribution of 
Corporate Governance index, and the sub-indices (Board, Shareholdings and 
Disclosure). This table also presents the pair-wise correlation between the 
indices. Appendix A gives detailed information on each sub-index.  The 
maximum score is 100, which is assigned if indicator is observed, 80 if largely 
observed 50 for partially observed and 0 if it is not observed. The total index 
consist of governance proxies in three sub-categories and is constructed using 
the equal weighting scheme. The average rating of CGI is 54.30 and it ranges  
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from 70.42 to 30.89.  The sub-index with highest rating is Disc (Disclosure, 
Transparency and Auditing), which can be explained by the fact that this area is 
emphasised by regulations of SECP. 
To investigate the determinants of corporate governance due to 
multicollenearity in ownership concentration and external finance firm corporate 
governance score is regressed on two set of determinants and results are reported 
in Table 3.2. One set includes concentration of ownership and control variable 
and other determinants include external finance plus control variables.  
Ownership structure shows negative and significant relationship with CGI and 
Disclosure scores however, when use interaction term of own with law the result 
shows no impact of legal environment. This suggests that weakness of 
investment protection and absence of corporate control firms rely on governance 
structure that is dominated by high concentration of ownership. The firm with 
concentrated ownership there is no reason to expect firms to disclose more. The 
inclusion of disclosure and transparency scores and other attributes are included 
in CGI scores also and they are not directly related to agency problem. In 
addition, this result indicates that negative relationship between corporate 
governance and ownership concentration is strong with weak legal regime. The 
Dunev and Kim (2006) have come up with same finding in case of US market.  
 
Table 3.2 
Evidence on Determinants of Corporate Governance 








EF  0.16** 
(1.92) 
  0.63** 
(1.62) 
  0.20*** 
(1.57) 
  0.29*** 
(1.53) 
 
Own    –1.34** 
(–1.89) 
  –0.30*** 
(–1.47) 
  –0.23* 
(–2.44) 
  –0.29 
(–1.33) 
































Lev  0.14** 
(1.92) 
  0.05** 
(1.71) 








LAW*OWN    0.12 
(1.11) 
  0.17 
(0.11) 
  0.11 
(0.61) 
  0.25 
(0.83) 
LAW*EF  0.001 
(0.56) 
  0.01 
(0.89) 
  0.004 
(1.02) 
  0.02 
(1.11) 
 












   
R2  0.31  0.31  0.29  0.30  0.30  0.29  0.30  0.31 
Note:    The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1  percent, 5  percent, and 10 percent 
respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
 
The results show positive association between need of external finance 
and corporate governance quality, because good practices are signal that insiders 
are adopting good practices. As a result the value of firm is higher and  
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entrepreneur can get easy and less costly access to external finance [Pistor, et al. 
(2003)]. The positive sign of the coefficient of size shows that large firms show 
better governance. Investment opportunities have positive impact both CGI and 
Disclosure scores. This confirms the theoretical notion that firms with better 
investment opportunities perform better corporate governance practice. The 
interaction terms of legal regime with external financing show positive and 
insignificant relationship with CGI and Disclosure scores which suggests that in 
legal environment which is less investor friendly firm specific factors matters 
more in choice of corporate governance practices. 
 
3.7.  Summary and Conclusion 
The corporate governance index and disclosure and transparency 
index are used which are developed using the information from the annual 
reports of the companies. In order to construct corporate governance index 
for the firms listed on KSE, a broad, multifactor corporate governance rating 
is done which is based on the data obtained from the annual reports of the 
firms submitted to SECP. The index construction is as follows: for every 
firm, there are 22 governance proxies or indicators are selected, these 
indicators are categorised into three main themes. The three categories or 
sub-indices consist of: eight factors for the board composition and 
independence, seven for ownership, shareholdings and seven for 
transparency, disclosure and audit. 
The sample firm consists of 00 firms which are active, representative 
of all non-financial sectors and comprises more than 90 percent of market 
capitalisation at Karachi stock market. In this  Chapter, we presented a 
simple model of determinants of corporate governance. Our result shows 
that the strength of corporate governance systems is affected by t he 
concentration of ownership, external financing needs of corporations, size, 
investment opportunities of the firm. Thus with good corporate governance 
standards in place; it is ultimately the financial market which rewards good 
governance practices and punishes bad governance. The results show that 
firms with high growth and large in size are in more need of external finance 
adopt better governance practices and are more transparent. The firms with 
more concentrated ownership do not follow the good quality governance and 
disclose less. The law does not matter in adopting good practices. Our 
results also generally confirm the prediction of the theory that enforcement 
of law does not matter in investment growth and ownership structure in 
weak legal regime countries like Pakistan. Thus legal protection is essential 
for effective corporate governance.  Our results adds an important link to the 
explanation of the consequences weak legal environment for financial 








Corporate governance is the means by which minority share holders are 
protected from the expropriation of the managers or controlling shareholders. 
Good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic development by 
enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their access to outside 
capital. In emerging markets good corporate governance serves a number of 
public policy objectives. It reduces vulnerability of the financial crises, 
reinforces property rights; reduces transaction cost and cost of capital and leads 
to capital market development. Corporate governance concerns the relationship 
among the management, board of directors, controlling shareholders, minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  
The better corporate governance leads to better firm performance by 
protecting the rights of outside investors from the expropriation of controlling 
shareholders. In Pakistan, with traditionally low dispersion of ownership, the 
primary methods to solve agency problems are the legal protection of minority 
investors, the use of boards as monitors of senior management, and an active 
market for corporate control. In contrast to developed  markets in Pakistan 
corporate governance is characterised by lesser reliance on capital markets and 
outside investors, but stronger reliance on large inside investors and financial 
institutions to achieve efficiency in the corporate sector. In this case, outside 
(smaller) investors face the risk of expropriation in the form of wealth transfers 
to larger shareholders. 
The main focus of this chapter is to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance for publicly listed Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) firms. In the firm level corporate governance characteristics we 
considered board composition and effectiveness, ownership and shareholding 
rights, auditing, transparency and disclosure quality. They are summarised in an 
aggregate corporate governance index (CGI) which is computed as sum of three 
indices. It is only investigated whether corporate governance broadly defined 
affect firm performance, but identify whether some corporate governance factors 
are more important than other corporate governance indices and firm value 
which is measured by Tobin Q, ROA and ROE with corporate governance 
practices adopted by these firms.  
This study extends our earlier work  [Javid and Iqbal (2007)] in several 
ways: by updating the data, adding more variables and using panel data 
estimation technique. It contributes to the emerging literature in Pakistan 
relating indices of corporate governance to firm level performance which is 
measured by Tobin Q (which is market performance measure and captures 
market  penetration) and return on assets and return on equity (accounting  
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performance measures). This study adds to existing literature by applying the 
relevance of law for corporate governance in Pakistan and emphasises that 
beyond the law on book, law enforcement must be credible  [La Porta,  et al. 
(1999); Pistor, et al. ( 2000)].  
The plan of the chapter is as follows. The review of empirical findings of 
previous research is presented in  Section 2. Section 3 briefly reviews the 
corporate governance policy framework of Pakistan.  Section 4 provides 
methodological framework and a description of the data. The results for the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation are presented in 
Section 5 and last section concludes. 
 
4.2.  Review of Previous Literature 
“In the new and evolving international environment with a large private 
sector and global integration of world capital markets, corporate governance has 
become the prominent topic of institutional reform. For governments, 
encouraging better corporate governance practices in policy making enables 
firms to raise more domestic as well as foreign capital. For firms, an efficient 
market will differentiate between the firms that embrace best corporate 
governance practices and those who find corporate governance a distraction. 
Therefore firms attempting to drive their competitiveness and reduce the cost of 
capital will adopt best corporate governance practices. For investors, corporate 
governance will be put on par with financial indicators when evaluating 
investment decisions because corporate governance has a significant impact on 
equity performance and risk”, FTSE (2005). 
La Porta,  et al. (1999) have shown that, for the 20 largest listed 
companies in 27 wealthy, industrialised countries, 36 percent are widely held, 30 
percent remain family controlled, and 18 percent are state-controlled, using a 20 
percent direct plus indirect ownership measure. 
“There are three general corporate governance models based on 
ownership: the separation of company ownership a nd control because 
shareholding is widely dispersed; a dominant owner who exercises control and 
appoints management; and an intermediate case where a large shareholder (a 
blockholder in the terminology) has veto power over major management 
decisions. Shareholder control may be achieved through majority ownership, or 
indirectly through the pyramiding of share ownership through affiliated 
companies that are part of the (family-controlled) business group. 
In Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and indeed most developing economies 
there is no separation of ownership and control; owners control their companies 
even when they are listed. The United States, United Kingdom and Japan are 
cases where, for most companies, shareholding is widely distributed, with no 
dominant blockholders. Even so, the US and the UK’s degree of emphasis on 
shareholder value and external market disciplines are at the other extreme from  
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the Japanese case. The continental European corporate governance systems are 
significantly different in some respects from the market-oriented Anglo-
American model. Each European country has its own distinct laws, institutions 
and norms. Corporate governance in Germany and Japan are often compared 
since both have relied heavily on relationship banking and monitoring by major 
bank creditors, in contrast to the greater reliance on capital market finance in the 
US and UK”, Patrick (2001). 
“In recent years, there has been significant effort to understand the 
agency conflicts among the different agents related to the firm  and the 
effectiveness of the internal and external control mechanisms in inducing 
managerial value-enhancing actions. These controls traditionally have been 
classified as internal or external. A recent group of studies in the area of 
corporate governance recognise the possible existence of interactions among the 
different control mechanisms. In this sense, Williamson (1983) states the 
substitution hypothesis between internal and external control mechanisms, 
according to that, when the takeover market is weak, as in the case of the 
Spanish market, there is a greater role for internal control mechanisms. The 
alternative control mechanisms are grouped forming the corporate governance 
system. Traditionally these systems have been classified as external (market 
oriented) and internal (network oriented). The external systems, dominant in 
Anglo-Saxon economies, are based on the control exerted by the markets. These 
systems are characterised by the existence of a highly developed and liquid 
capital market, with a high amount of listed companies. 
The Spanish economy is characterised by a low proportion of listed 
companies compared to the US or the UK. Moreover, the stock ownership is 
highly concentrated in the hands of non-financial companies, financial 
institutions and families. This lower development of the financial markets and 
the stability and concentration of stock ownership suggests that the Spanish 
corporate governance system is an internal one based on the board of directors 
and the supervisory role of large shareholders”, Fernandez and Arrondo 
(2005). 
There is a large of body of empirical research that has assessed the impact 
of corporate governance on firm performance for the developed markets 
[Anderson and Reeb  (2004); Bahjat and Black  (1999,  2001); Black,  et al. 
(2003); Bradley (2004); Drobetz, et al. (2004); Durnev and Kim (2005); Roe, et 
al.  (1996); Gompers, et al.  (2003) and numerous others]. These studies have 
shown that good governance practices have led the significant increase in the 
economic value added of firms, higher productivity and lower risk of systematic 
financial failure for countries. The studies by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) provide an excellent literature review in this 
area. It has now become an important area of research in emerging markets as 
well  [Klapper and Love  (2003); Javid and Iqbal  (2006) and Mir and Nishat 
(2004)].   
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There are some empirical studies that analyse the impact of different 
corporate governance practices in the cross-section of countries. A noteworthy 
study in this regard is done by Mitton (2001) find the firm-level differences in 
variables are related to corporate governance has strong impact on firm 
performance during East Asian Crisis in Korean, Malaysian, Indonesian, 
Philippines and Thailand. The results suggests that better price performance is 
associated with firms that have indicators of higher disclosure quality, with 
firms that have higher outside ownership concentration and with firms that are 
focused rather than diversified.  
Most of the empirical work for exploring possible relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance is done for developed markets. For 
US Firms a broad measure of Corporate Governance Gov-Score is prepared by 
Brown and Caylor (2004) and their findings indicate that better governed firms 
are relatively more profitable, more valuable and pay more cash to their 
shareholders. Gompers, et al. (2003) show that firms with stronger shareholders 
rights have higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lowest capital 
expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions. 
It is expected that limiting board size is to improve firm performance 
because the benefits by larger boards of increased monitoring are outweighed by 
the poorer communication and decision-making of larger groups [Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993)]. The study by Yermack (1996) provides an 
inverse relation between board size and profitability, asset utilisation, and 
Tobin’s Q which conform this hypothesis. Anderson,  et al. (2004) come to 
conclusion that the cost of debt is lower for larger boards, because creditors 
believe these firms are having more effective monitors of their financial 
accounting processes. Brown and Caylor (2004) find that firms with board sizes 
of between six and 15 have higher returns on equity and higher net profit 
margins than do firms with other board sizes. 
The relation between the proportion of outside directors, a proxy for 
board independence, and firm performance is inconclusive. Fosberg (1989), 
Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2002) find no relation between the 
proportion of outsider directors and various performance measures. Baysinger 
and Butler (1985) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) on the other hand show that 
the market rewards firms for appointing outside directors; Brickley, et al. (1994) 
find a positive relation between the proportion of outsider directors and the stock 
market reaction to poison pill adoptions; and Anderson et al. (2004) show that 
the cost of debt, as proxied by bond yield spreads, is inversely related to board 
independence. The studies that using financial statement data and Tobin’s Q find 
no link between board independence and firm performance, while those using 
stock returns data or bond yield data find a positive link  [Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black  (2002)]. Brown and Caylor (2004) do 
not find Tobin’s Q to increase in board independence, but they do find that firms  
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with independent boards have higher returns on equity, higher profit margins, 
larger dividend yields, and larger stock repurchases, suggesting that board 
independence is associated with other important measures of firm performance 
aside from Tobin’s Q. 
The evidence on the association between audit-related governance factors 
and firm performance is mixed. Brown and Caylor (2004) show that 
independent audit committees are positively related to dividend yield, but not to 
operating performance or firm valuation. Klein (2002) documents a negative 
relation between earnings management and audit committee independence, and 
Anderson,  et al. (2004) find that entirely independent audit committees have 
lower debt financing costs.  
The separation of CEO and chairman affects firms’ performance because 
the agency problems are higher when the same person holds both positions. 
Yermack (1996) shows that firms are more valuable, when the CEO and board 
chair positions are separated. Core, et al. (1999) finds that CEO compensation is 
lower when the CEO and board chair positions are separate. Brown and Caylor 
(2004) conclude that firms are more valuable when the CEO and board chair 
positions are separate.  
In past few years corporate governance has become an important area of 
research in Pakistan. Mir and Nishat (2004); Shaheen and Nishat (2004) 
empirically test the  link between corporate governance structure and firm 
performance for Pakistan using one year cross firm data and find a positive 
relation between governance and firm performance measures. Javid and Iqbal 
use panel data analysis and  document a positive and  significant association 
between the quality of firm-level corporate governance and firm performance 
for the period 2003 to 2006. 
There is an increasing interest in analysing affect of corporate governance 
on stock market in Pakistan but many issues in this area are uncovered. In 
particular, the firm-level corporate governance rating and its affect on the 
valuation of the firm, which is central issue of this area needs in depth research. 
It is in this perspective this chapter aims to make contribution in the literature on 
corporate governance.  
 
4.3. Data and Methodological Framework 
 
4.3.1. Data 
To asses the relationship corporate governance and firm valuation at firm 
level, data of 60 non-financial firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange is used.
11 
The data set is obtained from the annual reports of these firms for the year 2003 
to 2008. Data on rule of law has been taken from World Bank governance 
                                                 
11List of companies is provided in Appendix Table A1.  
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indicators. The ranking of rule of law as ranging from 0 to 1 for Pakistan is 0.34 
as average of five years. That indicates very poor legal environment for Pakistan 
in term of enforcement of law.
12 
The Corporate Governance index and sub-indices are developed in 
Chapter 3. The size is defined as natural logarithm of total asset and growth of 
sales is taken as investment opportunities. The leverage is defined as ratio of 
book value of long term debt to book value of total asset. The data of all these 
variables are obtained from the annual reports of the listed firms in the sample. 
The panel data models are used and GMM is adopted as estimation technique 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
4.3.2.  Empirical Methodology 
It is well established that country’s laws of corporate governance affect 
firm value.
13 The objective is to examine whether variation in firm-specific 
governance is associated with differences in firm value, when they have 
different characteristics (size, investment opportunities and leverage) and doing 
business in poor legal environment.
14 To explore the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm valuation: Tobin’s Q, return on assets, return on 
equity and dividend pay-out ratio. To test the hypothesis that the  firms with 
good corporate governance practices are valued higher, the model proposed by 
Black, et al. (2003) is used which is as follows: 
it i i i i i i CGI Lw Size Lev Inv CGI Perf e b b b b b a + + + + + + = * 5 4 3 2 1    (4.1) 
Where Prefi 
is performance measure Tobin’s, D/Pi, ROAi and ROE i are used to 
measure firm performance, CGIi 
is a vector of corporate governance index, Invi 
is investment opportunities measured by the past growth in sales, Lwi 
is rule of 
law that is used for the proxy of enforcement of law, and Sizei 
is measured by 
the log of total asset. ei 
is random error term. It is expected that firms that are 
adopting better governance practices with better investment opportunities and 
larger is size should have higher valuation. 
In exploring that good corporate governance cause higher firm valuation, 
an important issue is endogenity [Black,  et al.  (2003) and others]. The firms 
with higher market value would be more likely to choose better governance 
structure because the firm’s insiders believe that better governance structure will 
                                                 
12Although as Pakistan belongs to common law countries legal origin. In view of La Porta, 
et al. (1997) common law countries provide strong investor protection in term of law on books. The 
ranking of rule of law indicate the fact that enforcement of law is very low against high ranking on 
law on books.  
13La Porta,  et al. (2002) show that firm value is positively associated with the rights of 
minority shareholders. Daines (2001) finds that firms incorporated in Delaware have higher 
valuations than other U.S. firms. 
14As indicated by the ranking of rule of law by World Bank.  
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further raise firm value. In addition, the firms adopt good governance to signal 
that insiders are doing well to raise the firm value. A growing firm with large 
need of external financing has more incentive to adopt better governance 
practices in an attempt to lower cost of capital [Klapper and Love (2003) and 
Gompers,  et al.  (2003)]. These investment opportunities are reflected in the 
valuation of the firm, implying a positive association between governance and 
firm performance. Therefore, in estimating governance-performance relation the 
panel data estimation technique is used to control for endogenity.  
To deal with issue a set of control variables is included following Kaplan 
and Zingales, (1997); Black, et al., (2003) and Klein, et al. (2005). The firm 
performance is regressed on corporate governance indices and other control 
variables. Along with three governance indices, board, shareholdings and 
disclosure, a set of control variables which include size (ln assets), leverage 
(debt/total asset ratio) and investment opportunities (growth rate of sales) are 
used in estimation. Firm size and investment opportunities control for potential 
advantages of scale and scope, market power and  market opportunities. The 
leverage controls for different risk characteristics of firm.  
 
4.4.  Empirical Findings 
To investigate whether differences in the quality of firm level corporate 
governance also help to explain firm level difference in performance, we regress 
firm performance measures on index of corporate governance (CGIi) and control 
variables The firm’s performance is measured by Tobin Q, ROA, ROE and D/P 
and the results are reported in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. The results of association 
between corporate governance indices and Tobin Q are presented in Table 4.1. 
The Tobin Q is regressed on the total corporate governance index  CGIi with 
each sub-index add one by one along with set of control variables There is 
positive and significant relationship between CGIi  
and Tobin’s Q supporting our 
hypothesis that corporate governance affects firm value. The  CGIi remains 
positive but significance level reduces with adding more explanatory variables. 
This shows that the inclusion of firm characteristics h ave improved the 
specification of the model. Therefore we find evidence that corporate 
governance effects firm’s performance. This result suggests that a certain level 
of governance regulations in emerging market like Pakistan has not make the 
overall level of governance up to a point that governance remain important for 
investor. The inter-firm differences in firm characteristics matters to investor in 
valuing firm. This result is also conformed by several studies for developing 
markets as well as developed markets [La Porta, et al. (2002) and Drobetz, et al. 
(2004)]. The financial control variables are for the most part statistically 
significant. Investment opportunities have positive impact aggregate corporate 
governance index and sub-indices. This confirms the theoretical notion that 
firms with better investment opportunities perform better corporate governance  
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practice. The firm size has positive and significant association with firm 
performance. The leverage is positively and significantly related to firm 
performance. The interaction terms of legal environment with corporate 
governance show positive and insignificant relationship with Tobin Q which 
suggests that in legal environment which is less investor friendly firm specific 
factors matters more in choice of corporate governance practices. 
The results based on total corporate governance suggest that corporate 
governance does matter in Pakistani stock market. However these findings do 
not fully reveal the importance of each category of corporate governance to firm 
performance. The results regarding relationship of firm value with three sub-
indices and all control variables. These results indicate that two sub-indices 
except disclosure have positive and some significant impact on firm 
performance.  The board composition and ownership and shareholdings have 
some significant influence on firm performance. However investors are not 
willing to pay a premium for companies that are engaged in open and full 
disclosure. The results based on sub-indices reveal importance of board 
composition, ownership and shareholdings with firm performance and this 
evidence is also supported by other studies [Klein, et al. (2005)]. 
The board composition index has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on firm performance and when entered in model with other sub-indices it 
remains positive but become insignificant but coefficient of determination has 
improved. This past evidence generally failed to find any clear relation between 
board composition and firm performance. The survey of literature concludes that 
the evidence on this matter is ambiguous [Bahjat and Black (1999, 2000) and 
Hermalian and Weisbach (2003)]. The ownership and shareholdings sub-index 
has a positive effect on Tobin Q when it is entered into model alone however, 
when include with other sub-indices but this effect is turned insignificant. These 
results show that most of the firms have ownership with dominant block holder 
or have ownership concentration and in block holder firm board independence is 
not associated with good performance. The assumption of agency theory does 
not fully apply to these firms where the alignment of ownership and control is 
tighter thus suggesting the need of outside directors on the board of these firms. 
As control variables are included specification of model improves. 
The results of firm performance including control variables are also 
consistent with prior research. The coefficient of size is positive and significant in 
most of the cases. This shows that the listed firms that are  likely to grow faster 
usually have more intangible assets and they adopt better corporate governance 
practices. The coefficient of investment opportunities is significant and positive 
because higher growth opportunities are associated with higher firm valuation. 
The coefficient of leverage is positive and significant, is consistent with the 
prediction of standard theory of capital structure which says that higher leverage 
increase firm’s value due to the interest tax-shield [Rajan and Zingales (1998)].  
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The interaction terms of legal environment with corporate governance sub indices 
show positive and insignificant relationship with firm performance indicating that 
in weak legal regime the firm chose to adopt better governance practices. 
 
Table 4.1 
Evidence on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Tobin Q) 





       
Board    0.01* 
(5.04) 




    0.04** 
(3.14) 
  0.01 
(1.41) 






















































R2  0.29  0.28  0.28  0.29  0.30 
Note: The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
 
Table 4.2 
Evidence on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (ROA) 





       
Board    0.13* 
(2.00) 




    0.01 
(1.23) 
  0.13*** 
(1.52) 






















































R2  0.29  0.29  0.28  0.27  0.31 
Note: The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 




Evidence on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (D/P) 





       
Board    0.02* 
(2.06) 
    0.01 
(1.13) 
Share1
      0.01 
(1.41) 
  0.01 
(1.37) 






















































R2  0.30  0.28  0.29  0.29  0.31 
Note: The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
 
The results based on association between ROA and corporate governance 
and ROE and corporate governance are almost same. In Table 4.2 the results 
regarding relationship of firm value using return on assets with aggregate 
corporate index and three sub-indices and all control variables are presented. 
The evidence suggests that corporate governance affects corporate valuation in 
Pakistani; however, the importance of each category of corporate governance is 
not same in explaining firm performance. These results indicate that two sub-
indices: board composition and disclosures have positive and some significant 
impact on firm performance.  The ownership and shareholdings have no 
significant influence on firm performance. These results show that most of the 
firms have ownership with dominant block holder or have ownership 
concentration and in these firms the return on assets are not associated with 
good performance. The large sized firms with more investment opportunities 
and which are levered have high return on asset. As regards the quality of legal 
environment the interaction terms of rule of law with corporate governance 
show no relationship with return on asset which suggests that in weak legal 
environment the law does not matter in firm valuation [La Porta, et al. (2000)].  
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To investigate the relation between firm value measured by dividend pay-
out ratio and corporate governance D/P is regressed on corporate governance 
and firm attributes: investment opportunities, size, leverage and size. Positive 
and significant coefficient of CGI reveals the fact that firms with higher-quality 
corporate governance are valued higher and distribute the dividend more. When 
D/P is regressed on sub-indices of corporate governance, the board composition 
and disclosure and transparency index have positive and significant results but 
positive and insignificant for shareholder and ownership indices. In general the 
ownership and shareholders rights that align the  managers and shareholders 
interest are significantly valued by investors. This is also true for board 
composition and independence index.  Both sub-indices board and disclosures 
have positive association with firm performance. These results are consistent 
with agency theory which focuses on monitoring of managers whose interests 
are assumed to diverge from those of other share holders. However the 
assumptions of agency theory are not applied to block holder owned firms. Most 
of the firms listed on KSE are family owned or institution owned. In these firms 
the alignment of ownership and control is tight and thus suggesting the need of 
outside directors on the board. Interaction term for CGI with law has the 
expected positive sign for Pakistan with poor legal e nvironment is consisted 
with notion that positive relationship between corporate governance and 
valuation is stronger in weak legal regime. The study by Dernev and Kim (2006) 
also conclude that high class corporate governance is valued higher in case of 
US market. 
Investment opportunities have positive and significant impact on 
corporate valuation measured by the D/P in all specifications.  Our results 
confirm our predictions that firms with better investment opportunities have 
higher dividend payout ratio. The coefficient of size is positive and significant 
in most of the cases. This shows that the listed firms that are likely to grow 
faster usually have more intangible assets and they adopt better corporate 
governance practices. The coefficient of leverage is positive and insignificant, 
which is contrary with the prediction of standard theory of capital structure 
which says that higher leverage increase firm’s value due to the interest tax-
shield [Rajan and Zingales (1998)]. The result of interaction term of rule of 
law with corporate governance does not have any significant impact on the 
valuation of the firm. These results indicate that legal framework is not 
providing relevant information regarding firm dividend pay-out in case of 
Pakistan. However, these findings are consistent to some extent with the 
notion that positive relationship is between governance and valuation is 
stronger in weak legal regimes [La Porta,  et al.  (1997)]. This explains the 
reason of mixed relation between firm valuation and corporate governance in 
US firms which are subject to strongest legal framework worldwide [La Porta, 
et al. (1998) and Dunev and Kim (2006)].  
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When dividend pay-out is used as performance measure the aggregate 
corporate governance and the board composition and independence has a 
positive and statistically significant affect on firm’s dividend payout and when 
entered in model with other sub-indices. The ownership and shareholdings sub-
index has a positive effect on firm performance when it is entered into model 
alone and also when is included with other sub-indices but this affect is 
marginally significant or it remains positive but become insignificant but 
coefficient of determination has improved. These results show that most of the 
firms have ownership with dominant block holder or have ownership 
concentration and in block holder firm board independence is not associated 
with good performance. The assumption of agency theory does not fully apply 
to these firms where the alignment of ownership and control is tighter thus 
suggesting the need of outside directors on the board of these firms. As control 
variables are included specification of model improves. 
The results of dividend payout regressed on corporate governance 
including control variables are also consistent with prior research [Arnott and 
Asness  (2003) and Shaheen and Nishat  (2004)]. There is positive association 
between corporate governance and dividend payouts consistent with the 
theoretical notion that the firms that are better governed payout more. The 
coefficient of size is positive and significant in most of the cases. This shows 
that the listed firms that are likely to grow faster usually have more intangible 
assets and they adopt better corporate governance practices. The coefficient of 
investment opportunities is significant and positive because higher profitable 
opportunities are associated with higher firm valuation. The coefficient of 
leverage is positive and significant, is consistent with the prediction of standard 
theory of capital structure which says that higher leverage increase firm’s value 
due to the interest tax-shield [Rajan and Zingales (1998)]. The interaction terms 
of legal regime with investment opportunities show positive and insignificant 
relationship with CGI, board, shareholdings a nd disclosure scores which 
suggests that in legal environment which is less investor friendly firm specific 
factors matters more in choice of corporate governance practices. These results 
are consistent theoretical proposition of La Porta,  et al. (1999) and with 
empirical findings by Durnev and Kim (2006) and Pistor, et al. (2003). 
 
4.5.  Summary and Conclusions 
The relationship between corporate governance variables has been widely 
analysed for the developed markets but very little work has been done on how a 
broad range of governance mechanism factors effect the firm performance in 
thinly traded emerging markets. In this study we fill this gap by analysing the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for the 
Karachi Stock Market. To proxy for firm-level governance we use a rating 
system to evaluate the stringency of a set of governance practices and cover  
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various governance categories: such as board composition, ownership and 
shareholdings and transparency. Our sample firm consists of 50 firms which re 
active, representative of all non-financial sectors and comprises more than 80 
percent of market capitalisation at Karachi stock market.  
The results document a positive and significant relation between the 
quality of firm-level corporate governance and various firm performance 
measures. In general the ownership and shareholders rights that align the 
managers and shareholders interest are significantly valued by investors. This is 
also true for board composition and independence index.  Both these sub-indices 
have positive association with firm performance. These results are consistent 
with agency theory which focuses on monitoring of managers whose interests 
are assumed to diverge from those of other share holders. However, the 
assumptions of agency theory are not applied to block holder owned firms. Most 
of the firms listed on KSE are family owned or institution owned. In these firms 
the alignment of ownership and control is tight and thus suggesting the need of 
outside directors on the board. However, the results show that open and 
transparent disclosure mechanism that reduces the information asymmetry have 
no affect on firm performance. This is due to the reason that we have used the 
annual reports as data source and these reports do not reveal all the information 
required for rating corporate governance. As regards the quality of legal 
environment the interaction terms of rule of law with corporate governance 
show no relationship with firm performance; which suggests that even firms in 
weak legal environment can enjoy high valuation if they adopt better quality 
governance and disclose practices [La Porta, et al. (2000)]. 
Our results show that Corporate Governance Code 2002 potentially 
improves the governance and decision making process of firms listed at KSE. 
Large shareholders still have a tight grip of companies. However, one can argue 
that adequate firm-level governance standard can not replace the solidity of the 
firm. The low production and bad management practices can not be covered 
with transparent disclosures and transparency standards.  
 
Chapter 5:  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP  
 
5.1.  Introduction 
The nature of relation between the ownership structure and corporate 
governance structure has been the core issue in the corporate governance 
literature. From a firms’ perspective, ownership structure determines the firms’ 
profitability, enjoyed by different stake-holders. In particular, ownership 
structure is an incentive device for reducing the agency costs associated with the 
separation of ownership and management, which can be used to protect property 
rights of the firm  [Barbosa and Louri  (2002)]. With the development of  
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corporate governance, many corporations owned by disperse shareholders and 
are controlled by hire manager. As a results incorporated firms whose owners 
are dispersed and each of them owns a small fraction of total outstanding shares, 
tend to underperformed as indicated by Berle and Means (1932). Latter this 
theoretical relationship between a firm’s ownership structure and its 
performance is empirically examined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Shlefier and Vishny (1986). 
La Porta,  et al. (1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000) have shown that the 
countries with weak legal environment, the original owners tries to maintain 
large positions in their corporations which results in concentration of ownership. 
Equity ownership by insiders can align insider interest with those of 
shareholders, thereby leading to greater firm value [Klapper and Love (2002)] In 
underdeveloped markets in addition to weak legal enforcement reasons, due to 
underdeveloped nature of financial markets that would allow limited access to 
external financing and result in predominance of family firms [La Porta, et al. 
(1997, 1998) and Pistor, et al. (2003)]. In case of Pakistan the majority of the 
firms are owned by the family or institution [Cheema, et al. (2003) and Iqbal 
(2006)]. Further the researchers have comprehensively studied the conflict 
between managers and owners regarding the functioning of t he firm for 
developed markets, although, the research on understanding the differences in 
behaviour of different shareholder identities is limited for emerging markets. 
Corporate Governance reforms started with the introduction of Corporate 
Governance Ordinance in 2003. There is little work done to examine the 
association between corporate governance and corporate ownership pattern in case 
of Pakistan. Cheema,  et al. (2003) has identified only the nature of corporate 
ownership structure in Pakistan without  analysing its impact on corporate 
performance. Iqbal (2006) has investigated the relationship between performance 
and ownership shares of different categories of shareholders such as family 
ownership foreign investors’ ownership and institutional share holders but has not 
included the effect of other variable that might influence ownership concentration. 
She comes up with conclusion that the positive relationship between ownership 
concentrations as measured by top five shareholders and firm performance in 
general. We want to fill the gap of needed research area on the relation between 
corporate ownership and corporate governance in context of Pakistan. The 
association between equity ownership and firm performance is also investigated.  
The focus of this chapter is to investigate whether the equity ownership 
structure matters in case of Pakistan and its implications for corporate 
governance and corporate valuation. The remaining of this chapter is organised 
as follows. Section 2 reviews the important empirical studies concerning the 
relationship between corporate governance, ownership structure. In Section 3, 
the empirical s1pecification of the model is described. Section 4 presents the 
discussion of the empirical results. Last section concludes this chapter and gives 
policy implications.   
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5.2.  Review of Previous Literature 
One of the earliest treatments of ownership and control issues is the 
seminal work of Berle and Means (1932). Early work in this area was largely 
descriptive [Mean (1930, 1931)]. As research became systematic in approach, 
researchers relied primarily on agency theory to guide their studies. The 
central premise of this theory is that managers, as agents of shareholders 
(principals), can engage in decision making and  behaviours that may be 
inconsistent with maximising shareholders wealth [Fama and Jensen (1983); 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. As evidence of its applicability to ownership 
studies, agency theory has been characterised as “a theory of the ownership (or 
capital) structure of the firm”. More resent research has also noted the 
dominance of agency theory as the guiding framework for corporate 
governance studies generally ownership studies more specifically such as 
Daily, et al. (1998) and Dalton, et al. (2003)]. 
Agency theory suggests that the corporate form of organisation 
characterised by a professional management with little ownership operating 
business on the behalf of a large number of widely dispersed shareholders 
represent an archetypal principal agent problem  [Eisenhardt (1989)]. Managers 
who disregard shareholder interest may be ousted by powerful shareholders or 
by hostile takeovers. This presupposes that shareholders have an interest to 
indulge in monitoring managerial behaviour. However, shareholders differ with 
respect to incentives to spend resources on monitoring. Shareholders owing a 
miniscule proportion of shares of a firm have very little incentive to devote the 
necessary time and effort on voicing their view. 
Resource-based theory suggests that considerable resource heterogeneity 
exists among various shareholders categories. For an emerging economy firm, 
these differences arise from shareholders being foreign or domestic and financial 
or non-financial. The impact on firm performance of these owners with diverse 
resource endowments is expected to differ as a consequence of this 
heterogeneity in resources and organisational capabilities. 
A feasible solution to the agency problem that arises from separation of 
ownership and control is that managerial interests can be aligned with those of 
shareholders through equity ownership [Himmelberg, et al. (1999)].  
There is another focus of the ownership studies to reduce the agency 
problem–institutional investors and large block-holders. Institutional investors 
and large block-holders control an increasing amount of corporate equity. Many 
shareholders in these categories will take active interest in the governance of 
firms in which they invest because their ownership stakes do not permit them to 
easily divest the equity they hold in firms not meeting their performance 
expectations  [Lane,  et al.  (1998)]. If these individuals or groups sold their 
equity, given their relative large equity positions, it would trigger a precipitous 
decline in the value of their holdings.  
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Since Berle and Means ( 1932) the separation of corporate ownership 
from control has given rise to large literature devoted to elaborating, refuting or 
testing it. Hassen (1983) argued that if, as Berle and Mean claimed, corporate 
officers are promoting their own financial interests at the expense of the 
shareholders, then the remedy is to encourage shareholders to pay an active role 
in nominating and electing directors and thus influence the selection of the 
officers who run the enterprise. While Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
introduction of managerial share ownership may reduce these agency problems, 
thus aligning the interest of managers and shareholders. The potential problems 
associated with the separation of ownership and control in the corporate is 
subject of research for many decades and have witness an evolution from 
concentrated ownership to increasingly diffuse ownership. This trend towards 
increasing separation of ownership from management is documented by Berle 
and Means (1932) and they argue that managers might guard their own interest 
at the shareholders’ expense. Later Jensen and Meckling (1976), assert that firm 
value is reduced when ownership and control are separated rather than combined 
due to added costs of monitoring and the managers participate in activities that 
may not enhance firm value for the owners. In all other organisation 
configuration in which the decision-making and ownership functions are 
separated, costs are increased by the residual claimants since the potential exists 
for the different individual to pursue potentially conflicting optimisation paths 
[Daily and Dollings  (1992)]. However, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983a,1983b,1985) maintain that there are efficiencies to separating ownership 
and control into decision-making and risk-bearing functions which make 
dispersed ownership advantageous because the efficiency gains outweigh the 
agency costs. The findings of  Graff (1950) and Feinberg (1975) suggest that 
organisations with combined ownership and control, owner-operators may 
choose t o exchange profits for other benefits, such as choosing current over 
future consumption [Fama and Jensen (1985)] and on-the-job non-pecuniary 
consumption [Demsetz  (1983)]. Consequently, such organisations will likely be 
undervalued by the market. 
Although there is a presumption in the literature that large shareholders 
have power and stronger incentive to ensure shareholder value maximisation 
[Jensen and Meckling (1976); Zeckhouser and Pound (1990); Burkart (1997)] 
the theoretical relationship between large owners and firm value is ambiguous.
15 
The empirical evidence on corporate governance suggests that large owners 
have stronger incentive and better opportunities to exercise control over 
manager than small shareholders. Claessen, Djankov, and Pohl (1996, 1999) 
find evidence of a positive relation between shareholding concentration and firm 
                                                 
15Some authors find a relationship between ownership concentration and firm value or firm 
performance, other find no significant relationship, no conclusion can be drawn about the real effect 
of ownership concentration.  
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performance in Czech Republic, Kocenda and Svejnar (2002) only partly 
confirm that observation. Block-holder ownership above a certain level may 
lead to entrenchment of owner-mangers that expropriate the wealth of minority 
shareholders  [Fama and Jensen  (1983); Morck,  et al. (1989); Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997)]. A negative effect of market value on ownership concentration is 
proposed and supported by Demsetz and Lehn (1985). 
In the view of Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2001) concentrated ownership 
has its costs. They may arise when large shareholders, capable to influence 
corporate decision directly, maximise value for themselves and deprive small 
owners of their part of residual income. Other negative consequences of 
ownership concentration include raised cost of capital due to lower market 
liquidity or decrease diversification opportunities on the part of the investors 
[Fama and Jensen  (1983)]. Moreover, concentrated ownership prevents 
additional monitoring of managers by the stock market, which is available under 
diffused ownership with high liquidity of shares [Holmstrom and Tirole (1993); 
La Porta, et al. (1999); Claessens, et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002)] 
present ultimate control as well as the extent of concentrated ownership 
structure in publicly traded companies around the world. They found that 
publicly traded companies in most countries possess a higher level of ownership 
concentration. Yeh (2003) in Taiwan, Dzieranowski and Tamowicz (2004) in 
Poland and Cheema, et al. (2003) in Pakistan find that the companies’ shares are 
common concentrated in the hand of largest shareholders. 
In most of developing markets including Pakistan, the closely held firms 
(most often family controlled but also state-controlled firms or firms held by 
widely corporations and by financial institutions) dominate the economic 
landscape. The main agency problem is not the manager-shareholder conflict but 
rather the risk of expropriation by the dominant or controlling shareholder at the 
expense of minority shareholders. The agency problem in  these markets is that 




18 voting pacts and/or dual class voting shares 
that allow the ultimate owner to maintain (voting) control while owning a small 
fraction of ownership (cash flow rights). The dominant shareholder makes the 
decisions but does not bear full cost. Moreover large shareholders create group 
structure such as pyramids that enable them to transfer assets or profits to other 
dominated entities. These practices called tunnelling. The negative impact that 
                                                 
16Pyramids are a particular form of inter-firm shareholding arrangement in which firm A 
holds a stake in firm B, which holds a stake in firm C. The distinguishing characteristic of pyramid 
arrangement is that firm A is attempting to exercise control over firm C while minimising its 
financial investment in firm C, either directly or indirectly. 
17It occur when a firm’s employee sits on other firm’s board, and that firm’s employee sits 
on the first firm’s board. These employees are generally the CEO or another person high in 
management of their respective firms. 
18Cross-holding means company Y directly or indirectly controls its own stock.   
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large family shareholders can have on firm value can be even greater when 
family members hold executive positions in the firm. The choice of a family 
member as CEO can have a significant impact if the individual does not have the 
talent, expertise or competency to run the business and may lack have labour 
market. The opportunity cost created by a  suboptimal appointment will be 
shared by all shareholders while the private benefits accrue entirely to the family 
[Peres-Gonzalez (2001)]. Klein, et al. (2005) argue that differences in ownership 
structures across countries may create differences in the  governance-
performance relationship. Likewise, differences in the general environment (for 
example, competition in product and capital markets, the efficiency of the 
market for corporate control and managerial  labour markets) may produce 
different governance-performance relationship in different countries. Firms with 
large undiversified owners such as founding families may forgo maximum 
profits because they are unable to separate their financial preferences with those 
of outside owners. Families also often limit executive management positions to 
family members, suggesting a restricted  labour pool from which to obtain 
qualified and capable talent, potentially leading to competitive disadvantages 
relative to non-family firms [Morck, et al. 2000)]. Maury (2006) finds that in 
Western European Countries family control increase firm profitability, whereas 
legal environment protect minority shareholders against family opportunism. 
Ben-Amar  and Andre (2005) find  that a large proportion of Canadian public 
companies have controlling shareholders (families) that often exercise control 
over voting rights while holding a small fraction of cash flow rights. The long-
term nature of the founding-family ownership suggest that external bodies, such 
as suppliers or providers of  capital, are more likely to deal with the same 
governing bodies and practices for longer periods in family firms than in non-
family firms. Thus, the family’s reputation is more likely to create longer-lasting 
economic consequences for the firm relative to  non-family firms where 
managers and directors turn over on a relatively continuous basis [Anderson and 
Reeb (2003)]. 
Since Berle and Mean (1932), the conflict between manager and 
shareholders has been studied extensively by researchers seeking to understand 
the nature of the firm. When shareholders are too diffused to monitor managers, 
corporate assets can be used for the benefit of the managers rather than for 
maximising shareholder wealth. Therefore a solution to this problem is to give 
managers equity stake in the firm. Doing so will resolve the moral hazard 
problem by aligning managerial interests with of shareholders [Himmelberg, 
Hubbard, and Palia (1999)]. The capability of the managers to perform mutual 
monitoring depends on the dispersion of managerial power, a mutual monitoring 
system being more difficult to establish when there is a clear concentration of 
power in the hands of a single manager. If a single member of the managerial 
team clearly dominates the others, the rest of the managers could lack the power 
or even the information to control the head of the organisation [Fernandez and  
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Arrondo (2005)]. Stulz (1988) demonstrate that sufficiently high managerial 
ownership, by allowing managers to block takeover bids, can lower firm value. 
Using U.S data, Morck,  et al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995); 
Hermalin and Weisbch (1991); and Holderness, et al. (1999) all find firm value 
to rise with low levels of managerial ownership and to fall with higher levels of 
managerial ownership. 
The effects of foreign investment on economic performance have been the 
subject of perennial academic and popular debate. Anti-globalisation protesters have 
railed against the low wages paid in developing countries affiliates relative to those 
in developed source countries. Other has concerned themselves with the potentially 
negative effects of entry by foreign firms, with their global production network, on 
domestic suppliers of parts and component in upstream industries. On the other 
hand, most economists would point to higher levels of productivity and higher 
wages paid by foreign affiliates relative to other domestic producers in the host 
countries. They also emphasised the potential externalities from FDI including the 
knowledge spillovers from foreign affiliates to their less productive domestic 
counterparts. Particularly in concentrated domestic markets, another effect of entry 
by foreign firms may be an increase in the degree of product market competition, 
with attendant benefits to consumers in the form of lower price and implications for 
domestic firms’ incentive to innovate [Griffith, and Simpson (2004)]. Griffith and 
Simpson (2003) find foreign-owned firms are frequently the technological leaders 
within UK industries and that technology transfer from these technological leaders 
makes a substantial contribution to productivity growth in domestic-owned 
establishments. Griffith (1999) and Oulton (2000) argue that reason for the observed 
higher productivity of foreign-owned firm at the economy-wide level might simply 
be that they are disproportionately concentrated in high productive sectors. Choi and 
Yoo (2005) show that foreign investors positively affect firm performance by active 
monitoring, complementing the inadequate or inefficient monitoring of domestic 
institutions. Khanna and Palepu (1999) also provide evidence that foreign financial 
institutions are a source of not only financing but also scarce monitoring skills in 
emerging markets like India. It is not the ownership but the factors underlying 
ownership that matter. Control-enabling property rights are one such factor. In term 
of performance, firm in which property rights devolve unambiguously to foreign 
shareholders outperform firm in which foreign shareholders cannot exercise 
effective control. With control comes a level of profitability that is not available at 
lower levels of share holding. If foreign investors wish to enjoy relatively superior 
returns in India, and consider their associates as an integral part of their global 
operations, they should in term of investing at the levels that will provide them the 
control
19 [Chhibber and Majumdar (1999)]. 
                                                 
1951 percent shareholding in Indian firms gives foreign investors unambiguous control over 
assets and income partitioning. An over 51 percent stake has been assumed to imply not only 
operational control, but also over decision-making.   
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There is an extensive theoretical literature on the role and incentive of 
financial institutions/banks monitoring non-financial corporations. Chirinko, et 
al. (1999) explain that financial institutions might be important mainly because 
of their role as supplier of debt but also as equity holder. Apart from their role as 
shareholder and creditor, both of which are mechanism of outside control, 
financial institution, banks and other financial institutions (pension funds etc.) 
are also linked with firm through their representation on supervisory board. It is 
generally viewed that more equity the financial institution holds, the more it is 
information and power to monitor the firm’s management, thereby firm 
performance. But there is also a view that financial institution, notably banks, 
behave as monopolist, using their power (as the sole supplier of external 
finance) to extract profits from the firm at the expense of firm performance. 
Jensen (1989) argues that joint ownership of debt and equity by large informed 
investors (such as Japanese bank) results in stringent managerial monitoring and 
create strong incentive for managers to make value-maximising decisions. 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) are also of the view that financial institutions are 
well positioned to monitor the manager of the firm within their network. 
Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) study support the proposition that equity 
ownership by financial Institution in Japan effectively substitute for the missing 
external takeover
20 market by resulting in monitoring and intervening when 
necessary, thus reducing the incidence and severity of lapses from efficient 
behaviour. Sheard (1989, 1991), Aoki and Sheard (1992), and Morck and 
Nakamura (1999b) propose that financial institution equity block primarily as 
anti-takeover barriers. 
Recent literature on corporate governance also pays much attention to the 
issue of shareholders identity. It stress that the objective functions and the cost 
of exercising ownership control over managers very substantially for different 
types of owners. The implication is that it matters not only how much equity a 
shareholder owns, but also who is this shareholder—a family, a private person, 
worker, manager, financial institution or foreign enterprise. However much of 
the existing literature is based on the functioning of developed markets’ firms, 
and therefore presumes a wider dispersion in ownership structure than one find 
in developing markets like Pakistan where large share holdings are common in 
the world, except the US and UK [La Porta, et al. (1999),
21 it is argued that large 
share-holders’ incentive and ability to collect information and to monitor 
management reduce agency costs [Shleifer and Vishny (1986)]. Most of the 
works in literature have evolved around the developed economies and very little 
                                                 
20Takeovers: if a firm is inefficiently operated, then there is scope for improved performance 
if an outsider (or some of current shareholders) take over the firm, replaces its management, and 
initiates a new business strategy [Yafeh (2000)]. 
21Recent evidence highlights a substantial degree of ownership concentration including 
family ownership in large firms around the world [Morck, et al. (2005); Burkart, et al. (2004)].  
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is known (empirically) about such issues in emerging market economies, 
especially for Pakistan.
22 This study tries to fill this gap. 
 
5.3.  Data and Methodological Framework 
The analysis based on sample of 60 firms
23 listed at Karachi, Lahore 
Stock Exchange and Islamabad Stock Exchange over the time period 2003 to 
2008. We confine our analysis to non-financial firms and the selection of 60 
firms is primarily based on the availability of annuals reports of corporations for 
all sample years. Five ownership variables are included: ownership 
concentration (T5), family ownership (FAM), managerial shareholding (Dir), 
financial institution shareholding (Fin) and foreign investor’s shareholding 
(Fore). We use top five shareholders as proxy for the ownership concentration to 
analysis that whether corporate ownership affects corporate governance and 
corporate performance or not. In top five shareholders there is no distinguish 
between different categories of shareholders. Any cut-off level is not used for 
inclusion of any shareholder in top five categories.
24  
The family ownership is defined where a family or a group of family can 
control shares in a target company either by owing shares directly or indirectly 
through associated company [Cheema,  et al.  (2003)].  Thus family ownership 
comes from two sources: through direct ownership, through associated 
companies. Direct ownership is where the founder or a  member of his or her 
family by either blood or marriage is an officer, a director, or a blockholder, 
either individually or as a group. Associated companies are those companies that 
are associated with each other if one company controls another company, or two 
companies are controlled by the same person or family. 
Director Ownership is the share ownership by management and board of 
directors varies substantially across firms.  
Foreign Ownership are defined as companies which are incorporated 
outside Pakistan but have a place of business in Pakistan under the companies 
Ordinance, 1984, ‘Foreign Companies’. The Ordinance also defines a foreign 
subsidiary as a company in which more than 50 percent of the equity is held by a 
single foreign company. In Pakistan there is no legal limit by the government for 
minimum and maximum level of equity holding by foreign investors as compare 
                                                 
22Cheema, et al. (2003) provide descriptive nature of ownership structure of Pakistan’ 
corporate sector while empirical studies on relationship between ownership and performance are on 
their early stages.  
23List of sample firms is given in Appendix. 
24The idea behind 10 percent of the shares is that the passage of special resolution under the 
Pakistan Companies ordinance of 1984, as a result of which alteration in a firm’s activities can be made 
only by the 75 percent majority vote of shareholders in favour of such resolution. Only 10 percent class 
of shareholders have the ability to block the members’ special resolutions that are necessary to make 
significant changes. Moreover, disclosure of the aggregate of shareholding, restriction on the sale of 
shares to public are all associated with more than 10 percent holding of shares.   
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to India where no foreign investor hold more than 51 percent equity stakes of a 
firm.  Financial Institutions/Banks Ownership
25  is defined  as financial 
institutions in our sample represent legal minority shareholder (holding at least 
10 percent of share holders on average).
26 The GMM estimation technique is 
applied on panel data as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
5.3.1.  Determinants of Ownership Concentration 
Recent evidence suggests that In Pakistan ownership is concentrated 
[Chemma, et al. (2003); Iqbal (2006) and La Porta, et al. (1999)]. Most firms are 
closely held either by families, directors, foreign or institution owners. We 
distinguish among different ownership type in our analysis, we control 
ownership type in our ownership model and we also provide separate estimate of 
determinants of ownership for each ownership category. As mentioned above a 
block holder is defined to be any entity owning more than 10 percent of the firm 
equity. For robust empirical findings an alternate measure of ownership 
concentration such as the percentage of shares owned by the largest five block 
holders is also used.  In the absence of adequate investor protection 
concentration of ownership becomes a more important tool to resolve agency 
conflict between controlling and minority shareholder [Shleifer and Wolfenson 
(2002)]. Therefore the hypothesis tested is that  there is association between 
concentration of ownership and quality of corporate governance practices in 
case of Pakistani listed firms. To test this hypothesis the empirical specification 
of the model proposed by Pistor,  et al. (2003), Durnev and Kim (2005) and 
Klein, et al. (2005) are used: 
it i i i i i CGI Lw Size Inv CGI Own e b b b b a + + + + + = * 4 3 2 1        …  (5.1) 
In the model Owni 
is the ownership concentration of firm  iat time t. CGIi 
is a 
vector of corporate governance index, Invi 
is investment opportunities measured by 
                                                 
25Under the financial institutions ordnance, 2001 “Financial Institution” are defined as; (i) 
any company whether incorporated within or outside Pakistan which transacts the business of banking or 
any associated or ancillary business in Pakistan through its branches within or outside Pakistan and 
includes a government savings bank, but excludes the State Bank of Pakistan;  (ii) a modaraba or 
modaraba management company, leasing company, investment bank, venture capital company, financing 
company, unit trust or mutual fund of any kind and credit or investment institution, corporation or 
company; and (iii) any company authorised by law to carry on any similar business, as the Federal 
Government may by notification in the official Gazette, specify (The Financial Institutions 
Ordinance, 2001,XLVI of 2001).  
26The Company Ordinance, 1984 and the Code of Corporate Governance do not recognise 
minority shareholders with a shareholding below 10 percent. The minimum threshold for seeking 
remedy from the Court against mismanagement and oppression requires initiation of the company by 
no less than 20 percent of the shareholders. Shareholders representing 10 percent can apply to SECP 
for appointment for inspector for investigation into the affairs of the company. See section 263 and 
290 of the Company Ordenence,1984.  
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the past growth in sales, Lwi 
is rule of law that is used for the proxy of enforcement 
of law, and Sizei 
is measured by the log of total asset. eit 
 is random error term. 
It is expected that shareholders with greater cash flow rights practice 
lower quality corporate governance. The negative relationship between 
ownership and quality of corporate governance is stronger is stronger in weak 
legal regime  [Durnev and Kim  (2006); La Porta,  et al. (1998). The owner 
shareholders of the firm with more profitable investment opportunities divert 
less for outside shareholders gain and practice high quality governance [Durnev 
and Kim (2006); Johnson, et al. (2000)]. The firm level variables, we control the 
firm size and we expect an inverse relationship between Sizei and Owni due the 
risk neutral and risk averting effects because the market value of a given stake of 
ownership is greater in larger firm, this higher price should reduce the degree of 
concentration. At the same time risk aversion should discourage any attempt to 
preserve the concentration of ownership in face of l arger capital because this 
would require the owners to allocate more of their wealth to single venture 
[Domsetz and Lehn (1985)]. Following La Porta, et al. (1998) the ownership 
concentration of the firm is related to legal environment of the country, the rule 
of law index as a proxy for the efficiency of the legal environment is used. We 
expect to find negative relationship between ownership concentration and rule of 
law because in countries like Pakistan with poor investor protection ownership 
concentration might become a substitute for legal protection as shareholders 
may need to own more capital in order to exercise control.  
 
5.3.2.  Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 
The deficiency of external governance mechanism that is weakness of 
investor protection and absence of well developed market for corporate control leads 
investor to rely on governance structure that is dominated by highly concentrated 
ownership. In this section the impact of ownership concentration on the firm 
performance is examined. The firm performance improves when ownership and 
managerial interest are merged through concentration of ownership [Agrawal and 
Mandeike  (1987)]. The reason is that when major shareholdings are acquired, 
control can not be disputed and resulting concentration of ownership might lower or 
completely eliminate agency costs. In addition block holders might provide an 
opportunity to extract corporate resources for private benefits in a way that would 
have a negative effect on firm valuation. We propose hypothesis that there is positive 
relationship between concentration of ownership and firm performance. To test this 
hypothesis a regression equation linking the concentration of ownership with firm 
performance after controlling some firm variables as suggested by Pistor,  et al. 
(2003) and Klein, et al. (2005) is estimated: 
it i i i
i i i i i i
CGI Lw Own
Lw Size Inv CGI Own Perf
e b
b b b b b a
+ +
+ + + + + =
* * 6
5 4 3 2 1    
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Where Perfi is measure of performance for firm  i at time t, return on assets 
ROA, return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q, remaining variables are same as 
defined for model (5.1). When profitable investment opportunities are there, the 
controlling shareholders divert to concentrated ownership and corporate 
valuation become higher. The positive relationship between ownership and firm 
value is higher in weak legal environment [La Porta, et al. (2002), Durnev and 
Kim (2006)]. It is expected that firms with better investment opportunities, 
better corporate governance practices should have higher valuation. 
 
5.3.3. Ownership Identity and Firm Performance 
Since  the type of ownership concentration might vary across firms 
according to the identity of large shareholders, we postulate that the relationship 
between larger shareholder and firm performance depends on who the large 
shareholders are. The concentration of ownership split into four separate groups, 
director ownership, family ownership, institutional ownership, foreign 
ownership. The separate analysis for each ownership type is performed as well. 
The hypothesis is that the identity of ownership matters in determining the firm 
performance. The following model is estimated to determine the relationship 
between ownership identity and firm performance.  
it i i i i i i ijt
j
j i Own Lw Inv Lw Size Inv Own Perf e + b + b + b + b + q + b = ￿ * * 5 4 3 1 0   (5.3) 
Where Ownijt is the percentage of share held by owner of type j of firm  iat time 
t. Fur ownership variables are included to see the impact of different categories 
of ownerships: family ownership (Fam), the managerial shareholding (Dir), 
financial institution shareholding (Fin) and foreign investor’s shareholding 
(Fore).Other variables are the same as used in model (5.1) and (5.2). 
 
5.4.  Empirical Findings 
The analysis begins by exploring the determinants of ownership 
concentration. The ownership concentration is measured as percentage of 
share owned by the largest five shareholders in a firm, and a block is defied 
as to be any entity owning more than 10 percent of the firm’s equity. The 
panel data estimation to estimate model (5.1) for five specifications with 
aggregate  CGIi 
index and with sub-indices that are board composition, 
shareholdings and audit, disclosure and transparency. The results are 
presented in Table 5.1. 
The results suggest that there is negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and quality of corporate governance as indicated by negative and 
significant coefficient of CGIi. The study of Duenerv and Kim (2006) suggest 
there is positive relation between cash-flow rights and corporate governance, 
however,  Morck, et al.  (1996)  and  McConnell  and  Servaes (1990) argue that  Table 5.1 
Determinants of Concentration of Ownership by Top Five Shareholders 
Variables  Model 1      Model 2      Model 3   Model 4  Model 5 
CGIi 
 




           






































































Lw*CGI      –0.03 
(–0.32) 
  –0.07* 
(–4.51) 
  –0.03* 
(–2.78) 
  –0.06* 
(–3.21) 



















2  0.23  0.25  0.27  0.26  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.27  0.27 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics.   
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greater ownership concentration may align their interest with minority 
shareholders, but it results in greater degree of managerial entrenchment.   The 
transparency scores (Disci), board composition score (Boardi) and shareholding 
scores (Sharei)
 
when included in the model 2, 3, 4, 5  the  relation becomes 
insignificant and shows that these governance indicators do not effect the 
concentration of ownership. There is no reason to expect that firms where 
ownership is concentrated they disclose more, or board has any role etc. This 
negative coefficient of law variable with corporate governance index suggests 
that the relationship between ownership concentration and quality of corporate 
governance is stronger in weak legal regime and. This suggests in the absence of 
adequate legal protection for investor, concentration of ownership become an 
instrument to resolve agency conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders. This result suggests that ownership concentration is indeed a 
response of poor legal protection [La Porta,  et al. (1999); Durnev and Kim 
(2005)]. The leverage is not a significant determinant of ownership 
concentration in all cases. The effect of Invi is always positive and significant in 
all our models, which shows that more investment opportunities leads to more 
concentration of ownership and when firm suffers from a substantial drop in 
profitable investment opportunities, the controlling shareholders divert more 
corporate resources. Johnson (2000) documents such behaviour by Asian firms 
before t he East Asian crisis. The positive relationship between investment 
opportunities and concentration of ownership is stronger in weak legal 
environment. The impact of Sizei 
on OWNi 
is negative indicating that ownership 
concentration is significantly lower as the firm size expands and Boubakri, et al. 
(2003) have also documented a negative association between the size and 
ownership concentration. 
As regards the results of effect of ownership concentration and firm 
valuation, the regression results are based on two accounting measures (ROA 
and ROE) and market measure that is Q-ratio for firm performance. We estimate 
different specifications for each performance measure and Tables 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 
presents the results.. Our results are consistent with several empirical findings 
that document a positive and significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance implying that ownership concentration 
matters in determining firm’s value. Another important finding is the favourable 
effect that market bestows on firms that follows good practices and is 
transparent. The positive corporate governance index and disclosure and 
transparency score imply that the firm that practice good governance and 
disclose more achieve superior performance compared to other firms. However, 
firm level variable show significant relationship with firm performance. We find 
that large size firms are more likely to achieve better performance. The reason 
might be that the competition effects and the market power of large-sized firms 




Relation between Tobin Q and Ownership by Top Five Shareholders 























           
















































































Law*CGIi      –0.10 
(–0.17) 
  0.05* 
(5.03) 
  0.01 
(1.05) 
  0.04* 
(4.12) 


















R Square  31  0.32  0.34  0.32  0.32  0.31  0.32  0.33  0.33 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
 
Table 5.2.2 
Relation between ROA and Ownership by Top Five Shareholders 

























           






































































Law*CGIi      0.26 
(0.12) 
  –0.22 
(–0.56) 
  0.63** 
(1.92) 
  0.12 
(0.27) 


















R Square  0.30  0.31  0.32  0.31  0.32  0.31  0.32  0.33  0.33 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics.  
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investment opportunities outperform compared to those which have less 
investment opportunities. Nevertheless we fail to find any impact of leverage on 
the firm value. The interaction term of any variable with law enforcement term 
are not significant in any model suggesting that firm performance is not affected 
by rule of law in countries where legal environment is weak. 
The type of ownership concentration varies across firms according to the 
identity of large shareholders, we explore the relationship between firm 
performance depends on who are the large shareholders. For deeper analysis we 
split the split  the concentration of ownership into four separate groups of 
owners: director ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership and 
institutional ownership. Different specifications are estimated in a system of 
equation given in model (5.3) to determine the relationship between ownership 
identity and firm performance after controlling for firm level variables. The 
results reported in Tables 5.3.1, 5.3.2, and 5.3.3.  The results in Table 5.3.1. 
Indicates that all type of ownership concentration have positive and significant 
effect on firm performance. The family ownership results in better firm value 
relative to other type of ownership, as indicated by higher coefficient 
significance level. The family’s historical presence, large equity position, and 
control of management and director posts place them in an extraordinary 
position to influence and monitor the firm.   
The results of foreign ownership support our prediction that foreign 
ownership shares positively impact firm performance. The fact that foreign 
shareholders use their ownership stakes as a means to foster their strategic 
interest, which securing access to new markets, location specific resources and 
low cost production facilities. These findings are consistent with theoretical 
argument claiming that family owners and foreign owners bring better 
governance and monitoring practices. 
There is insignificant positive effect associated with financial institution 
ownership. These results can be attributed to the dominance of government 
owned financial institution in corporate equity holding. The corporate 
governance index and disclosure and transparency have positive effect on 
performance. The results support our previous findings that size and investment 
opportunities have significant effect in most of our model. The interaction of 
corporate governance with legal term has no impact.  
The results of Tables 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 also indicate that ownership 
identity matters for the firm performance. Different agents play their role 
while determining firm performance. In Tables 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 the results of 
foreign ownership support our hypothesis that foreign ownership shares 
positively impact firm performance. One reason for the higher productivity of 
foreign-owned multinational might simply be that they are concentrated in 
high productivity sectors. Moreover, in domestic market, they tend to       




Evidence on Performance and Ownership Identity 

























































CGIi    0.19 ** 
(1.98) 
    0.15** 
(1.89) 
    0.21*** 
(1.73) 
 
Disci      0.18** 
(1.66) 
    0.02** 
(1.74) 
    0.01*** 
(1.54) 










































           

































2  0.30  0.31  0.31  0.29  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.31  0.31 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
 
Table 5.3.2 
Evidence on Performance and Ownership Identity 
  Tobin Q  ROA  ROE 






















































CGIi    0.01 
(1.24) 
    0.01 
(1.13) 
    0.01 
(1.11) 
 
Disci      0.52* 
(3.55) 
    0.49 
(2.65) 
    0.41* 
(2.04) 





















































































2  0.28  0.29  0.29  0.28  0.29  0.29  0.28  0.29  0.29 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 




Evidence on Performance and Ownership Identity 
.  Tobin Q  ROA  ROE 

















































Disci      0.32* 
(3.07) 
    0.31* 
(2.98) 
    0.32* 
(3.01) 





















































































2  0.25  0.27  0.27  0.25  0.27  0.27  0.25  0.27  0.27 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
 
Financial institutions have positive and insignificant influence on firm 
performance that indicates ineffectiveness of financial institution in Pakistani 
corporate sector. 
Table 5.4 shows Director Ownership (Dir) have positive and significant 
impact on the firm performance. The results are in agreement with our 
prediction that block-holdings by directors’ increase firm value. Managers have 
a strong incentive to manage their companies well and generate wealth as their 




Evidence on Performance and Manager-Ownership 
  Tobin Q  ROA  ROE 


















CGIi    0.11** 
(1.74) 
    0.04** 
(1.89) 
    0.11*** 
(1.84) 
 
Disci      0.01* 
(1.96) 
    0.02** 
(1.74) 
    0.01*** 
(1.63) 





































































2  0.30  0.29  0.29  0.28  0.29  0.30  0.29  0.30  0.30 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
 
5.5.  Summary and Conclusion   
This chapter determines the factors influencing the ownership 
concentration, and the effect of this on the other aspects such as firm performance 
using representative sample of 60 firms. The results reveal that in Pakistan 
corporations has more concentration of ownership which is the response of weak 
legal environment and this result validates the La Porta, et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000) findings. The concentration of ownership seems to have positive effect on 
firms’ profitability and performance measures. There is negative association 
between corporate governance practices and disclosures and transparency with 
concentration of ownership. The identity of ownership matters more than the 
concentration of ownership. The results indicate that firm specific factors matters 
more in concentration of ownership. The findings reveal that more investment 
opportunities provides greater opportunity to for ownership concentration, 
however size has opposite effect and leads to delusion of ownership. It results in 
diverse ownership to get wider access to funds and share ownership. These results 
are consistent with studies Boubakri, et al. (2003). 
   
Chapter 6:  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  
EXTERNAL FINANCING 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
Corporate governance is a mechanism in which the supplier of finance to 
corporations assures themselves of getting return on their investment. It makes  
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supplier of finance get manager to return some of the profits to them, and make 
sure that managers do not use for their interest the capital they supply or invest it 
in unprofitable projects, above all how do the supplier of finance control 
managers  [Shleifer and Vishny  (1997)].   The enterprises need finance for 
investment and acquire it either by internally generated finance or externally 
generated finance, which are closely related to the ownership structure, financial 
market development and enforcement of law of a country. In companies with 
foreign owners have an advantage in their access to external finance as compare 
to domestically owned companies because their financial resources coming from 
abroad.  
The access to external finance is an important factor to determine the 
ability of a firm to operate and expand. The economic researchers have studied 
how various macroeconomic and microeconomic factors influence such access; 
for example, the empirical literature shows that the need of external finance 
depends on the macroeconomic environment because the availability of external 
financing varies with the change  in the business cycle conditions and change in 
monetary policy in particular.  This credit channel research argues that corporate 
access to credit is the principal mechanism linking monetary policy and the real 
economy [Kashyap,  et al.  (1993, 1995) and Oliner and Rudebusch  (1996a, 
1996b). At the micro level, research has shown that characteristics specific to a 
firm influence the degree to which macroeconomic changes affect its access to 
external financing; specifically, firms that are more vulnerable financially—such 
as smaller, younger, riskier, and more indebted firms—are found to be more 
affected by tighter monetary policy  [Atanasova and Wilson  (2004) and 
Bougheas, et al. (2006)]. 
This is conformed by empirical evidence that firms with high dependence 
on external finance grow faster in countries where external finance is readily 
available [Pistor, et al. (2003) and La Porta, et al. (1999)].  Corporations with 
limited access to external resources may still operate in the informal sector and 
at a reduced scale in under developed countries [Pistor, et al. (2003); Rajan and 
Zingler (1998); Livine and Zervos (1998)]. La Porta, et al. (1999) argue that in 
countries where legal environment provides protective to the rights of outside 
investors, investors are willing to finance firms by equity and debt and financial 
markets become expanded and valuable. On the other hand in countries where 
legal environment is weak investors’ rights are not protected the financial 
markets remains under-developed.  
Many studies show that to promote economic growth attention has shifted 
to the capital markets due to the limited conventional sources of raising finance. 
In capital markets, corporate governance plays important role in determining 
external financing sources provided by outside investors. Corporate governance 
institutions appear to be weaker in developing than in developed countries and 
thus provide less of a check on managers in developing countries who wish to  
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issue equity to finance low return investments. Managers who wish to undertake 
low return investments in countries with strong corporate governance systems 
accordingly prefer to rely on internal cash flows to finance these investments, 
managers making similar investments in countries with weak corporate 
governance systems are freer to use the equity market as a source of finance 
[Pistor, et al. (2003)]. Thus, differences in corporate governance structures will 
be seen to explain both differences in the sources of finance for investment 
across countries and differences in the returns on investment [Gompers, et al.  
(2003)]. Corporate governance has recently received much attention for this 
purpose  the impact of corporate governance practices on access to external 
financing is investigated in case of Pakistan.  
This empirical analyses is extension of our earlier study [Javid and Iqbal 
(2007)] which  identify the determinants of external finance resources The firm 
with profitable investment opportunities lead to more diversification due to need 
of more external financing. The firms with greater external financing reliance 
are better performing firms. This study contributes to existing literature by 
exploring the firms which rely more on external finances have higher value. In 
addition in this study panel data estimation technique is applied. To establish the 
empirical framework on the basis of theory which suggests that with better legal 
environment of country investors are  more willing to provide external funds 
debt and equity, the rule of law is used as indicator of enforcement of law in 
Pakistan. The effects of ownership is captured by focusing only on the 
concentration of ownership in the hand of top five shareholders and this 
restriction is in line with the previous literature that reveal the fact that in 
countries like Pakistan with weak governance practices, it is efficient for the 
corporations to retain control of their firms in hand of few investors.
27 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 of the chapter 
presents review of the literature. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. 
Section 4 presents empirical finding.  Section 5 concludes the chapter.   
 
6.2.  Review of Previous Literature 
“Corporate governance rules, norms and procedures have evolved 
gradually over times as firms and economies develop and grow. This is reflected 
in the industrial and financial histories of the advanced industrial nations: the 
U.K., the U.S., continental Europe, and Japan. The prototypical pattern is that a 
firm is founded by an entrepreneur and his family who own, control, manages 
and finances it. Over time, the successful firm grows and becomes large, and 
evolves over generations from family to professional management, from family 
to more or less dispersed share ownership with public listing of the company on 
the country’s stock exchange, and from informal to extensive, formal external 
                                                 
27See Jensen and Meckling (1977), Zingales (1995), Bebchuk (1999).  
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finance. While this may be the general pattern, or at least the stereotype, there 
are considerable national and firm-specific variations in the nature and degree of 
separation of ownership and control, and some large firms remain under 
inherited family control. And of course there are always new firms which have 
grown rapidly and remain under founder control”, Patrick (2001). 
A large body of empirical literature suggests that financial market 
underdevelopment and limited availability of bank credit is serious barrier for 
the establishment of new enterprises and constraint to economic growth.
28  The 
literature on law and finance shows that investor protection plays an important 
role in shaping the financial structure of an economy, by affecting the relative 
importance of equity and debt financing [La Porta, et al. (1999)]. 
In the view of Patrick (2001) the sources of corporate governance change 
and improvement lie not only within the firm, but particularly in the financial 
markets, where lenders, bondholders, and shareholders condition the cost and 
availability of funds on good corporate governance and performance, supported 
by government changes in relevant legal rules and their implementation, 
including those of standards-setting organisations of accountants and other 
professionals. 
“Under the agency view, managers over invest to reap private benefits 
such as “perks”, large empires, and entrenchment. Since the external capital 
market limits the extent to which managers can pursue self-interested 
investment, an influx of cash flow enables the manager to invest more and 
increases investment distortions. Under asymmetric information, the managers 
themselves (who act in the interest of shareholders) restrict external financing in 
order to avoid diluting the (undervalued) shares of their company. In this case, 
cash flow increases investment, but reduces the distortion”,  Malmendier and 
Tate (2004). 
In Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2005) study the relation between firm-level 
disclosure quality and the availability of external finance to Finnish firms. They 
estimate excess growth is made possible by external finance and the excess 
growth is associated with the quality of disclosure which seems to be strongest 
for financially constrained firms. Their empirical analysis identify the firms in 
need for external finance voluntarily look for good disclosure quality, because it 
reduces barriers to external finance. 
Durnev and Kim (2006) in their study using firm-level governance and 
transparency data on 859 firms in 27 countries, find that firms with greater 
growth opportunities, greater needs for external financing, and more 
concentrated cash flow rights practice higher-quality governance and disclose 
more. Moreover, firms that score higher in governance and transparency 
                                                 
28Rajan, and Zingales (1998), Levine (1999), Cetorelli, Nicola, and Philip Strahan (2006), 
De Soto, Hernando (2000), Beck, Levine, and Loyaza (2000), Black, Sandra and Strahan (2002), 
Beck, Demirguk-Kunt, and Levine (2005).   
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rankings are valued higher in the stock market. All these relations are stronger in 
countries where investment environment is less investor friendly, demonstrating 
that firms do adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient governance 
practices. 
The findings of  La Porta,  et al. (1997, 1998) show that weak investor 
protection limits excess to external finance. While De Soto (2000) suggests that 
poor legal enforcement of corporate laws and unclear property rights limit 
individuals' ability to commit contracts and thus their excess to external 
resources. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) argue that better transparency and 
disclosure of information to the shareholders, and the enforcement of laws that 
protect their rights, reduce the costs of external finance. Perotti and Volpin 
(2007) provide evidence that better investor protection not only  favour 
competition and entry into the financial developed sector, it is also better for the 
politically accountable countries. The paper also suggests that improving formal 
investor protection laws while ignoring its enforcement may not improve access 
to finance. 
In view of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) financial liberalisations 
are most successful in countries with good political institutions. Bebchuk and 
Neeman (2006) provide evidence that block-holders by using corporate 
resources protect their control benefits and may undermine good corporate 
governance. La Porta, et al. (1997, 1998) in their study conclude that differences 
in the structure of laws and quality of their enforcement, such as legal origin of 
their laws, play important role for the differences in financial development 
among different countries. Empirical results of Beck and Levins (2005) also 
show that legal origin
29 has very significant impact on firm’s abilities to raise 
external finance. Their data indicate that firms in French Legal Countries face 
higher obstacles in contracting for external finance than firms in other countries. 
Firms in countries with common law face lower financial obstacle than firms in 
civil law countries. Moreover their result also indicate that foreign-owned firms 
and large firms face lower financing obstacles than domestic, or small firm, 
whereas family owned firms particularly face high obstacle in raising external 
finance. Countries with high GDP face lower obstacle in raising external finance 
than countries with lower GDP. 
González, Lopez, and Saurina (2007) examine access by Spanish firms to 
external financing from bank and non-bank sources over the period from 1992 to 
2002 and their results provide insights into the determinants of firms’ borrowing 
efforts in Spain and more broadly. For example, they find that Spanish firms are 
quite dependent on short-term, non-bank financing, which is less sensitive to 
firm characteristics than bank financing. Yet, short-term bank financing is 
accessed more frequently during economic expansions, suggesting that firms 
                                                 
29La Porta, et al. (1998) identify mainly two legal families around the world, common law 
origin and civil law origin.  
 
60 
substitute away from more expensive forms of non-bank financing as their 
conditions improve. The authors confirm that smaller, younger, riskier, and 
more indebted firms rely more on external credit than on internal financing, such 
as retained earnings and other equity, and they expand these results by showing 
that the nature of firms’ banking relationships, such as the number of banks 
borrowed from and whether collateral is required for the loans, also influences 
access to external finance. 
This work is extension of our earlier study Javid and Iqbal (2007) in 
which we investigate the determinants of external financing and conclude that 
the firms with greater growth opportunities, greater needs for external financing 
practice higher-quality governance and disclose more. In this chapter we explore 
firms that rely more on external financing sources are valued higher in the stock 
market.  
 
6.3. Data and Methodological Framework 
 
6.3.1. Data 
To analyse determinant of external recourses, and linking access of 
external finance with corporate governance, corporate and corporate valuation at 
firm level, the data of 60 non-financial firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange 
is used. Any direct measure of external finance is not available therefore; 
following La Porta, et al. (1998), the ratio of the stock market capitalisation held 
by minorities to sales is used as proxy for external finance for all 60 non-
financial firms.  The financial variables are obtained from the annual reports of 
the firms. The GMM estimation technique is applied to estimate panel data 
model as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
6.3.2.  Methodological Framework 
The purpose is to examine the factors that influence the need of firms for 
external finance through equity, when they have adopted different level of corporate 
governance and doing business in poor legal environment.
30 The firms which rely on 
external financing are higher valued firms. The empirical evidence suggest that the 
firms with greater need of external financing for a given level of profitable 
investment opportunities practice high quality governance [Durnev and Kim (2006) 
and Rajan and Zingales (1998)]. The contrary evidence comes from the study by 
Demirgue-Kunt and Maksimovie (1998) which argues that profitable firms have 
more internally generated funds and hence rely less on external financing.  It is 
expected that there is positive relation between external financing needs and quality 
of corporate governance. Further, in countries with weak legal regimes firms have 
difficulty in raising external finance due to investors’ lack of trust in legal protection 
                                                 
30As indicated by the ranking of rule of law by World Bank.  
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of their rights [La Porta, et al. (1998)]. In this study the significance of rule of law as 
determinant of external financing is analysed. Since the influence of legal 
environment across the firm is assessed, therefore it is introduced in interaction 
terms. To test the hypothesis that the firms which are in need of greater external 
finance practice higher level of corporate governance, following La Porta, et al. 
(1997) and Pistor,  et al. (2003) the empirical specification of the model becomes: 
it i i i i i i i CGI Lw Lev Size Inv Own CGI EF e + b + b + b + b + b + b + a = * 6 5 4 3 2 1    (6.1)     
Where  EFi 
is external finance that is calculated by multiplying market 
capitalisation of each firm with percentage of shares that are not taken by the top 
five shareholders of each firm, CGIi 
is a vector of corporate governance index, 
Invi 
is investment opportunities, Lwi 
is rule of law that is used as the proxy of 
enforcement of law, Sizei 
is the size of firm and Levi. ei 
 is random error term. 
To investigate that the firms, which rely more on external finance are 
valued higher. The firm performance is regressed on external finance, corporate 
governance and control variables. The model is given below:  
it i i i i i i i CGI Lw Lev Size Inv CGI EF Perf e + b + b + b + b + b + b + a = * 6 5 4 3 2 1    (6.2) 
Where Prefi 
is performance indicators measured as ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. 
and other variables are same as defined for model (6.1). It is expected that firms 
with better investment opportunities, better corporate governance practices 
should have higher valuation. 
A growing firm with large need of external financing has more incentive 
to adopt better governance practices in an attempt to lower cost of capital 
[Klapper and Love  (2003) and Gompers,  et al.  (2003)]. These growth 
opportunities are reflected in the valuation of the firm, implying a positive 
association between more reliance on external sources and firm performance. 
The firms with more need of external finance would be more likely to choose 
better governance structure because firm’s insiders believe that b etter 
governance structure will further raise firm value they adopt good governance to 
signal that insider behave well and they can easily excess to external finances.  
In the set of control variables which include size (natural logarithm of 
assets) and investment opportunities (average sale growth) are used in 
estimation. Firm size and growth control for potential advantages of scale and 
scope, market power and market opportunities. The leverage (long term 
debt/total assets) controls for different risk characteristics of firm.  Ownership 
concentration is expected to substitute the weak investor protection and lack of 
financing due to underdevelopment of the financial markets. In some firms the 
entrepreneur founders who used their own resources and retained e arning to 
finance their firms and have significant ownership stakes in the listed firms, this 
issue is addressed by using ownership concentration by top five largest 
shareholders.   
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6.4.  Empirical Evidence 
To investigate whether differences in the quality of firm level corporate 
governance help to explain firm level financial needs in a cross-section of 
companies  the external financing need  is regressed on index of corporate 
governance score and control variables and Table 6.1 reports the results.  The 
results indicate that there is positive association between need of equity 
financing and quality of corporate governance taken as aggregate corporate 
governance index and also with board, transparency and disclosure scores of 
these firms, though the significance level is marginal. This suggests that firms 
which need more equity financing practice good governance.  The interaction 
term of law with corporate governance have no significant impact. As regards 
the concentration of ownership it is negatively associated with reliance on 
external financing sources. This result is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) results who argue that countries with stronger shareholder protection, 
investors can afford to take minority position rather than controlling stakes. As a 
result firms tend to dispersed shareholders as owners and capital market are 
rather liquid. By constrict where shareholders rights are not well protected, the 
investor compensate this deficiency of financing by taking controlling stakes in 
a firm. The investment opportunities are positively related to external finance 
and suggest that firms with high growth are in more need of external finance. 
These results suggest the firm specific factors matters more in influencing the 
need of external financing when the legal environment is less investor friendly.  
 
Table 6.1 
Determinants of External Financing through Equity 





     
Dis    0.08** 
(1.67) 
  0.56* 
(1.98) 





















































2  0.28  0.27  0.27  0.29 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics.  
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To investigate the relation between firm value and access to external financial 
resources, the three performance measures Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE. Performance 
indicators are regressed on external finance, corporate governance and firm attributes: 
investment opportunities, size and interaction of enforcement of law with external and 
corporate governance and Table 6.2 presents the results. The firm that adopt better 
governance practices and disclose more in order to access less costly financing sources 
and these factors adds to their performance. Positive and significant coefficient of 
aggregate governance score and disclosure score indicate this fact that firms with 
higher-quality corporate governance and which are transparent are valued higher. In 
general the firms that align the managers and shareholders interest and are transparent 
are significantly valued by investors. These results are consistent with agency theory 
which focuses on monitoring of managers whose interests are assumed to diverge from 
those of other share holders. The study by Dernev and Kim (2006) also conclude that 
firms in need of external finance follow high governance practices and high class 
corporate governance is valued higher in case of US market. Investment opportunities 
have positive and significant impact on corporate valuation in all the models. These 
results confirm the predictions that firms with better investment opportunities have 
higher valuation. The coefficient of size is positive and significant in most of the cases. 
This shows that the large-sized firms that are likely to grow faster usually rely more on 
external resources and they adopt better corporate governance practices. The results of 
interaction term of rule of law with corporate governance and external financing do not 
have any significant impact on the valuation of the firm. These results indicate that 
legal framework is not providing relevant information regarding firm valuation in case 
of Pakistan. However, these findings are consistent to some extent with the notion that 
positive relationship is between access to external finance, governance and valuation is 
stronger in weak legal regimes [La Porta, et al. (1997); Pistor, et al. (2003); Durnev 
and Kim (2006)].  
 
Table 6.2 
Evidence on Firm Performance and Need of External Finance 





















CGIi    0.23** 
(1.94) 
    0.11** 
(1.88) 
    0.03** 
(1.97) 
 
Disci      0.04* 
(2.00) 
    0.11** 
(1.96) 
    0.01** 
(1.87) 






















































Law*CGIi      –0.68 
(–1.27) 
    0.–70 
(–1.49) 
    0.92** 
(–1.74) 



















2  0.30  0.31  0.32  0..29  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.31  0.31 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics.  
 
64 
6.5.  Summary and Conclusion   
The factors that influence access to external finance are investigated 
widely for the developed markets but very little work has been done on how 
factors effect access to external finance in case of emerging markets. In this 
study the gap is filled by analysing an important issue of our times that the firms 
that are growing faster and need more external finance are one that practice 
good governance and are transparent in case of Pakistani Market. To address 
this issue empirically two models are estimated. First, the determinants of 
external financing through equity are investigated. Second, it is examined that 
firms that are more in need of external finance are valued higher in the stock 
market. Our sample firm consists of 60 non-financial firms which are listed on 
the Karachi Stock Exchange and comprises more than 80 percent of market 
capitalisation at Karachi stock market.  
The results show that the strength of corporate governance systems 
affects the access to external financing of corporations. This suggests that 
firms which need more equity financing practice good governance.  The 
results show that firms with high growth and large in size are in more need 
of external finance. The results also generally confirm the prediction of the 
theory that positive relationship between more access to external financing 
and valuation is strong in weak legal regime countries like Pakistan. Thus 
legal protection is essential for effective provision  of financing.  One 
implication that comes out from these findings that pro-growth polices 
generate more profitable investment opportunities and stimulate the external 
financing needs of the corporations. These results adds an important link to 
the explanation of the consequences weak legal environment for financial 
market development, external financing, corporate valuation and corporate 
governance. 
 
Chapter 7:  CONCLUSION 
The relationship between corporate governance variables has been widely 
analysed for the developed markets but very little work has been done on how a 
broad range of governance factors effect the corporate performance, corporate 
ownership, and corporate access to external financing in thinly traded emerging 
markets. In this study this gap is filled by analysing the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate valuation, its ownership structure and its 
ability to access to external financing for the Karachi Stock Market. To measure 
the firm-level governance we use a rating system to evaluate the stringency of a 
set of governance practices and cover various governance categories: such as 
board composition, ownership and shareholdings and transparency, disclosure 
and auditing. The sample consists of 60 non-financial firms listed on Karachi 
Stock Exchange and comprises more than 80 percent of market capitalisation at 
Karachi Stock Market in 2007.  
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The corporate governance index and disclosure and transparency index 
are used which are developed using the information from the annual reports of 
the companies. In order to construct corporate governance index for the firms 
listed on KSE, a broad, multifactor corporate governance rating is done which is 
based on the data obtained from the annual reports of the firms submitted to 
SECP. The index construction is as follows: for every firm, there are 22 
governance proxies or indicators are selected, these indicators are categorised 
into three main themes. The three categories or sub-indices consist of: eight 
factors for the Board, seven for ownership, shareholdings and seven for 
transparency, disclosure and audit. The weighting is in the construction of index 
is based on subjective judgments. The assigned priorities amongst and within 
each category is guided by empirical literature and financial ex perts in this area. 
The maximum score is 100, then, a score of 100 is assigned if factor is observed, 
80 if largely observed, 50 for partially observed and 0 if it is not observed at all. 
The average is taken out and we arrive at the rating of one sub-index.
31  By 
taking the average of three sub-indices we obtain CGI for a particular firm. 
After measuring the corporate governance index, the analysis begins by 
estimating a simple model of determinants of corporate governance. To 
investigate the determinants o f corporate governance the individual firm 
corporate governance score is regressed on ownership concentration, access to 
external finance, investment opportunities, firm size, leverage and interaction 
term of rule of law with external finance and ownership concentration.  
Ownership structure shows negative and significant relationship with aggregate 
corporate governance and disclosure scores however, when the interaction term 
of ownership with law there is no impact of legal environment. The 
concentration o f ownership is negatively related with corporate governance. 
This suggests that weakness of investment protection and absence of corporate 
control firms rely on governance structure that is dominated by high 
concentration of ownership. The firm with concentrated ownership there is no 
reason to expect firms to disclose more. The inclusion of disclosure and 
transparency scores and other attributes are included in corporate governance 
index scores also are not directly related to agency problem. In addition, this 
result indicates that negative relationship between corporate governance and 
ownership concentration is strong with weak legal regime. Investment 
opportunities and firm size have positive impact both aggregate corporate 
governance score and disclosure scores. This confirms the theoretical notion that 
firms with better investment opportunities and larger in size adopt better 
corporate governance practice. The interaction terms of legal regime with 
external finance and concentration of ownership show insignificant relationship 
with corporate governance index and disclosure scores which suggests that in 
                                                 
31Sub-Index include (i) Board composition index, (ii) The ownership and shareholdings 
Index,  (iii) Disclosure and Transparency.  
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legal environment which is less investor friendly firm specific factors matters 
more in choice of corporate governance practices. 
In exploring the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
valuation, the firm performance is linked to corporate governance, investment 
opportunities, firm size, and leverage and interaction term of law enforcement 
with corporate governance. The results document a positive and significant 
relation between the quality of firm-level corporate governance and firm 
performance. The firm performance is measured by two market level measures: 
Tobin Q and dividend payout ratio and two accounting measures: return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). In general the ownership and 
shareholders rights that align the managers and shareholders interest are 
significantly valued by investors. This is also true for board composition and 
independence index.  Both these sub-indices have positive association with firm 
performance. These results are consistent with agency theory which focuses on 
monitoring of managers whose interests are assumed to diverge from those of 
other shareholders. However, the assumptions of agency theory are not applied 
to block holder owned firms. Most of the firms listed on KSE are family owned 
or institution owned. In these firms the alignment of ownership and control is 
tight and thus suggesting the need of outside directors on the board. However, 
the results show that open and transparent disclosure mechanism that reduces 
the information asymmetry have no affect on firm performance. This is due to 
the reason that we have used the annual reports as data source and these reports 
do not reveal all the information required for rating corporate governance. 
The factors which determine the ownership concentration are explored, 
and the results suggest that there is negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and quality of corporate governance practices. The results reveal 
that in Pakistan corporations has more concentration of ownership which is the 
response of weak legal environment and this result validates the La Porta, et al. 
(1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) findings. This result suggests that ownership 
concentration is a response to poor legal protection  [La Porta,  et al.  (1999)], 
Durnev and Kim  (2006)]. The leverage is not a significant determinant of 
ownership concentration in all cases. The affect of profitable investment 
opportunities .is always positive and significant in all our models, which shows 
that more investment opportunities leads to more concentration of ownership 
and when firm suffers from a substantial drop in profitable investment 
opportunities, the controlling shareholders divert more corporate resources. The 
impact size on concentration of ownership is negative indicating that ownership 
concentration is significantly lower as the firm size expands. 
The concentration of ownership seems to have positive effect on firms’ 
profitability and performance measures. Our results are consistent with several 
empirical findings that document a positive and significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance implying that ownership 
concentration matters in determining firm’s value. There is negative association  
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between corporate governance practices and disclosures and transparency with 
concentration of ownership. The results indicate that firm specific factors 
matters more in concentration of ownership. The findings reveal that more 
investment opportunities provides greater opportunity to for ownership 
concentration, however size has opposite effect and leads to delusion of 
ownership. It results in diverse ownership to get wider access to funds and share 
ownership. The interaction term of any variable with law enforcement term are 
not significant in any model suggesting that firm performance is not affected by 
rule of law in countries where legal environment is weak. 
For deeper analysis the concentration of ownership is split into f our 
separate groups of owners: director ownership, family ownership, foreign 
ownership and institutional ownership. The results indicate that all type of 
ownership concentration have positive and significant effect on firm 
performance. The results indicate that family ownership concentration results in 
better firm value relative to other type of ownership, as indicated by higher 
coefficient significance level. These findings are consistent with theoretical 
argument claiming that family owners and foreign owners bring better 
governance and monitoring practices. The corporate governance index and 
disclosure and transparency have positive effect on performance. The results 
support our previous findings that size and investment opportunities have 
positive and significant effect in most of our model.  
In this study the determinants of external finance are also examined. The 
results show that the strength of corporate governance systems affects the excess 
to external financing by corporations. This suggests that firms which need more 
equity financing practice good governance.  Thus with good corporate 
governance standards in place, it is ultimately the financial market which 
rewards good governance practices and punishes bad governance. The results 
show that firms with high growth and large in size are in more need of external 
finance. Thus legal protection is essential for access to less costly external 
financing. The relationship between external financing and ownership 
concentration (percentage shareholding by top five shareholders) is negative; 
however, investment opportunities and size both have positive impact on firm 
value. This confirms the theoretical notion that firms with better investment 
opportunities and more intangible assets perform better corporate governance 
practice. The interaction terms of legal regime with corporate governance have 
no insignificant relationship which suggests that in legal environment which is 
less investor friendly firm specific factors matters more in choice of corporate 
governance practices. 
In investigating the relation between firm value and access to external 
financial resources we come to the conclusion that the firms need more external 
finance which have more profitable investment opportunities and are also valued 
higher. These firms adopt better governance practices and disclose more in order 
to access less costly financing sources and these factors adds to their  
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performance. The fact that the firms with higher-quality corporate governance 
practices and which are transparent; investors are more willing to provide 
finance to them. These results are consistent with agency theory which focuses 
on monitoring of managers whose interests are assumed to diverge from those of 
other share holders and investor feel protected and expect to get returns of his 
investment. The results investigating the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate ownership reveal that in Pakistan corporations has 
more concentration of ownership which is the response of weak legal 
environment and this result validates the La Porta,  et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000) findings. The concentration of ownership seems to have positive effect on 
firms’ profitability and performance measures. There is negative association 
between corporate governance practices and disclosures and transparency with 
concentration of ownership. The identity of ownership matters more than the 
concentration of ownership. The results indicate that firm specific factors 
influence more in concentration of ownership. The findings reveal that more 
investment opportunities provides greater opportunity to for ownership 
concentration, however size has opposite effect and leads to delusion of 
ownership. It results in diverse ownership to get wider access to funds and share 
ownership. These results are consistent with studies Boubakri, et al. (2003). 
The results show that Corporate Governance Code 2002 potentially 
improves the governance and decision making process of firms listed at KSE. 
Large shareholders still have a tight grip of companies. However the results 
show that the firm level factors are more important indicate that adequate firm-
level governance standard can not replace the solidity of the firm. The 
implication that the results suggests is that the low production and bad 
management practices can not be covered with transparent disclosures and 
transparency standards. Other implication that comes out from these findings 
that pro-growth polices generate more profitable investment opportunities and 
stimulate the external financing needs of the corporations. In Pakistan 
corporations has more concentration of ownership which is the response of weak 
legal environment. These results adds an important link to the explanation of the 
consequences weak legal environment for external financing,  corporate 
valuation and corporate governance. 
One can argue that a good corporate governance system should combine 
some type of legal protection of both the rights of large investors and those of 
small investors. Indeed, corporations in successful market economies, such as 
the United States, Germany, and Japan, are governed through somewhat 
different combinations of legal protection and concentrated ownership. In 
Pakistan there is lack of mechanisms for legal protection of investors and 
ownership concentration is substitute for this. The analysis suggests that the in 
revising corporate governance regulations SECP should adapt the international 






A1: Corporate Governance Index (CGI) Components 
 
Sub-Index 1: The Board of Directors                                              
  (i)  Board Size (number of directors). 
  (ii)  Board Composition (Clear cut job description of all board members). 
  (iii)  Chairman CEO Separation (if not any lead director). 
  (iv)  Outside directors available to board (independent directors, nominee 
directors). 
  (v)  Board attendance (board meetings). 
  (vi)  Outside director attendance in Meetings. 
  (vii)  Existence of the position of CFO. 
  (viii)  Directors representing minority shareholders. 
 
Sub-Index:2 Ownership and Shareholdings                                            
  (i)  Presence of outside block holder (more than 10 percent 
shareholdings). 
  (ii)  Does the CEO own shares. 
  (iii)  Directors ownership (block ownership) other than CEO and 
Chairman. 
  (iv)  Chairman or CEO is Block Holder (10 percent). 
  (v)  Concentration of ownership (Top five). 
  (vi)  Dividend Policy. 
  (vii)  Staff benefits other than wages and salaries. 
 
Sub-Index 3: Transparency, Disclosures, and Auditing                                             
  (i)  Does the company have full disclosure of corporate governance 
practices. 
  (ii)  Does the company disclose how much it paid to its auditor for 
consulting and other work. 
  (iii)  Does the company disclose full biographies of its board members. 
  (iv)  Disclosure of internal audit committee. 
  (vi)  Disclosure of board directors and executive staff members’ 
remuneration. 
  (vii)  Disclosure in the company’s annual report) of share ownership 
according to the requirement of Code. 
  (viii)  Information of the executive management staff members ownership 




Description of Variables 
Variable  Symbol  Definition 
Firm Value  Q  Tobin Q defined as sum of the book value of long term 
debt and market value of the equity divided by the 
book value of the total asset. Source: Annual Reports 
of Corporations. 
Return on Assets  ROA  A performance measure. It is measured by operating 
profit divided by the book value of total asset. Source: 
Annual Reports of the Corporations. 
Return on Equity  ROE  A performance measure. It is measured by operating 
profit divided by the equity capital. Source: Annual 
Reports of the Corporations. 
External Equity Finance  EF  Market capitalisation of each firm multiply with 
percentage of shares that are not taken by the top three 
shareholders. Source; Market capitalisation from 
Business Recorder’s website: 
(www.brecorder.com.pk), percentage of shares are not 
held by top three shareholder is  from annual reports of 
corporation. 
Investment Opportunities  Inv  Average Sales Growth. Source:  Annual Reports of 
Corporations. 
Corporate Governance  CGI  Score of Corporate Governance Index. Source. 
Disclosure  Disc  Disclosure and Transparency Scores. Source:  
Shareholding and Ownership  Share  Shareholding and Ownership Scores.  
Board Composition  Board  Board Composition Score. 
Ownership Concentration  Own  Percentage of share ownership of first Five largest 
shareholders. Source: Annual Reports of Corporations: 
Annual Reports of Corporations. 
Family Ownership  Fam  Percent Share held by Family: Annual Reports of 
Corporations. 
Director Ownership  Dir  Percent Share held by Directors: Annual Reports of 
Corporations. 
Foreign Ownership  Fore  Percent Share held by Foreign: Annual Reports of 
Corporations. 
Financial Institution Ownership  Fin  Percent Share held by Family: Annual Reports of 
Corporations. 
    Percent Share held by Financial Institution ICP, NIT: 
Annual Reports of Corporations. 
Size of the Firm  Size  Ln(Assets). Source: Annual Reports of Corporations. 
Law  Lw  Rule of Law. Source: World Bank. 
Profit  Pr  Net income/total assets.  Source: Annual Reports of 
Corporations. 
Leverage  Lev  Book value of Long-term Debt/Book value of total 




List of Companies Included in the Sample 
Name of Company  Symbol  Sector 
Abbot Pakistan  ABBOT  Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
Aruj Garments  ARUJ  Textile Composite 
Agriauto Industries Ltd.  AGIL  Engineering and Allied 
Al-Ghazi Tractors  AGTL  Auto and Allied 
Azam Textiles  AZTL  Textile Composite 
Ayesha Textile  AYTL  Textile Composite 
Brother Textiles Ltd.  BRTL  Textile Composite 
Bata Pakistan  BATA  Leather and Allied 
Cherat Cement  CHCC  Cement 
Crescent Textile Mills  CRTM  Textile Composite 
Crescent Steel  CSAP  Engineering 
Dadabhoy Cement  DBYC  Cement 
Dar Es Salaam Sugar  DSSL  Sugar and Allied 
Din Motors  DEEN  Auto and Allied 
Fuji Fertiliser Bin Qasim  FFCL  Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
Dawod Hericules  DHML  Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
Engro Chemical Pakistan  ENGRO  Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
Faisal Spinning   FASM  Textile Spinning 
Emco Industries Ltd.  EMIL  Glass and Allied 
Fauji Fertiliser   FFCL  Fertiliser 
Fateh Textile  FTHM  Textile Composite 
Ferozson Ltd.  FZML  Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
Ellcot Spinning Mills  ESML  Textile Spinning  
Gul Ahmed Textile  GULT  Textile Composite 
Honda Atlas  HONDA  Auto and Allied 
Hub Power Co.  HUBC  Power Generation & Distribution 
I.C.I. Pak  ICI  Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
Indus Motors  INDU  Auto and Allied 
Indus  Polyester Company  IDML  Auto and Allied 
Japan Power  JPPO  Power Generation & Distribution 
Karachi Electric Supply  Co.  KESC  Power Generation & Distribution 
Lever Brothers Pakistan  LEVER  Food and Allied 
Metropolitan Steel  MMSL  Engineering and Allied 
Mandviwalla Mauser Ltd.  MMPL  Plastic and Allied 
Merit Packing Ltd.  MPL  Paper and Board 
Maple Leaf Cement  MPLC  Cement 
Mohammad Farooq Textiles  MFTL  Textile Composite 
Mitchell's Fruit  MFFL  Food and Allied 
Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills  MPKS  Sugar and Allied 
National Refinery  NATR  Fuel and Energy 
Nestle Milk Pak Ltd.  NESTLE  Food and Allied 
Oil and Gas Development Corp Ltd.  OGDC  Fuel and Energy 
Packages Ltd.  PACK  Paper and Board 
Pakistan PVC Ltd.  PVCL  Cables and Electric Goods 
Pakistan Tobacco Company   PAKT  Tobacco 
Pakistan Hotel Development Ltd.  PHDL  Service 
Pakistan Services  PKSL  Leather 
Pakistan Gum and Chemicals Ltd.  PAKG  Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
PTCL   PTC  Fuel and Energy 
Pakistan Petroleum Ltd.  PPL  Fuel and Energy 
Pakistan Papaersack Corporation  PPCL  Paper and Board 
Sitara Chemicals  SITC  Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
Sui Southern Gas Company  SNGC  Fuel and Energy 
Sui Northern Gas Company  SSGC  Fuel and Energy 
Shahtaj Sugar Mills  SSML  Sugar and Allied 
Sindh Abadgar Sugar  SASL  Sugar and Allied 
S.G. Fibre Ltd.  SGFL  Textile Composite 
Suzuki Motorcycles  SMCL  Auto and Allied 
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